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Whether it is a ﬁnancial institution like Wells Fargo, an automotive
company like General Motors, a transportation company like Uber, or a
religious organization like the Catholic Church, failing to properly prevent,
detect, investigate, and remediate misconduct within an organization’s
ranks can have devastating results. The importance of the compliance
function is accepted within corporations, but the reality is that all types
of organizations—private or public—must ensure their members comply
with legal and regulatory mandates, industry standards, and internal
norms and expectations. They must police thousands of members’ compliance with hundreds of laws. And when compliance failures occur at these
complex organizations they can be signiﬁcant and widespread in both
scope and associated harms.
Yet, careful examination and assessment reveals that many of the
most signiﬁcant and damning scandals occurring within organizations
of late were entirely avoidable. Research within the ﬁeld of corporate
governance focuses on how firms are structured because those structures
can result in better decisionmaking within the firm. Structure refers to
the manner of separating the work in an organization into subunits and
dividing the control of and responsibilities for the work. The ﬁeld of
compliance relies heavily on these insights from corporate governance,
which has led to a focus on what organizational structures will lead to
compliance programs likely to prevent and detect misconduct within
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ﬁrms. When it comes time to investigate potential incidents of misconduct
and determine whether they are material events, however, complex
organizations must go beyond issues related to the best manner in which
to structure a compliance program. Instead, this Article argues that ﬁrms
must focus on process-based reforms—or the actions, practices, and
routines ﬁrms employ to communicate and analyze information—that
will bolster a ﬁrm’s “Complex Compliance Investigations” and act as a
safety net when compliance programs fail to detect or appropriately
respond to misconduct within ﬁrms.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the best efforts of governments, regulators, prosecutors,
private stakeholders, and academics to identify effective mechanisms for
organizations to employ in an effort to prevent and deter improper
conduct within their ranks, misconduct continues to persist within
organizations of all types. Fake bank accounts. Faulty ignition switches.
Sexual harassment. Protection of predators. Over and over again, the
public learns of widespread and signiﬁcant misconduct plaguing organizations that millions of individuals rely upon on a daily basis. Most troubling,
however, is that the breadth and depth of many of these scandals were entirely
avoidable.
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For example, in 2016, Wells Fargo announced that it had entered into
an agreement to pay “a combined $185 million penalty to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau . . . , the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the City and County of Los Angeles to settle charges”
without admitting formal wrongdoing that it fraudulently opened
accounts on behalf of customers without their knowledge.1 The initial
settlement, however, was just the beginning of difficulties for the bank,
and it has now entered into multiple settlements with the DOJ,2 the SEC,3
and the Federal Reserve,4 among others.5 In addition to actions brought
1. Bethany McLean, How Wells Fargo’s Cutthroat Corporate Culture Allegedly Drove
Bankers to Fraud, Vanity Fair (May 31, 2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/05/
wells-fargo-corporate-culture-fraud [https://perma.cc/6G23-MNAZ].
2. E.g., Press Release, DOJ, Justice Department Obtains $5.4 Million in Additional Relief
to Compensate Servicemembers for Unlawful Repossessions by Wells Fargo Dealer Services (Nov.
14, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-obtains-54-million-additionalrelief-compensate-servicemembers-unlawful [https://perma.cc/MX78-FR6Y]; Press Release,
DOJ, Justice Department Reaches $4 Million Settlement with Wells Fargo Dealer Services for
Illegally Repossessing Servicemembers’ Cars (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
justice-department-reaches-4-million-settlement-wells-fargo-dealer-services-illegally [https://
perma.cc/C4AY-TP2V]; Press Release, DOJ, Wells Fargo Bank Agrees to Pay $1.2 Billion for
Improper Mortgage Lending Practices (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/wellsfargo-bank-agrees-pay-12-billion-improper-mortgage-lending-practices [https://perma.cc/
CVZ6-TUNB].
3. E.g., Order Approving Plan of Distribution, Exchange Act Release No. 80,302, 116
SEC Docket 1642 (Mar. 23, 2017); Order Instituting Administrative Cease-and-Desist
Proceedings, Securities Act Release No. 9349, Exchange Act Release No. 67,649, Investment
Company Act Release No. 30,167, 104 SEC Docket 1445 (Aug. 14, 2012); Press Release, SEC,
Wells Fargo Advisors Admits Failing to Maintain Controls and Producing Altered Document,
Agrees to Pay $5 Million Penalty (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014207 [https://perma.cc/6BBA-SEZQ].
4. E.g., Written Agreement Between Wells Fargo & Company and Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, Docket No. 18-007-B-HC (Feb. 2, 2018); Wells Fargo & Co., Wells
Fargo Update: Federal Reserve Consent Order 1 (2018), https://mms.businesswire.com/
media/20180202005711/en/638742/1/3837099cWells_Fargo_Consent_Order_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XDP8-3ZEJ]; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Responding to Widespread Consumer Abuses and Compliance Breakdowns by Wells Fargo,
Federal Reserve Restricts Wells’ Growth Until Firm Improves Governance and Controls.
Concurrent with Fed Action, Wells to Replace Three Directors by April, One by Year End
(Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/enforcement
20180202a.htm [https://perma.cc/34LR-G72W] [hereinafter Fed. Reserve Wells Fargo Press
Release].
5. See, e.g., Emily Flitter, Wells Fargo Agrees to Settle Auto Insurance Suit for $386
Million, N.Y. Times (June 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/07/business/wellsfargo-auto-insurance-lawsuit-settlement.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Imani Moise,
Wells Fargo to Pay $575 Million in Settlement with U.S. States, Reuters (Dec. 28, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wells-fargo-settlement/wells-fargo-to-pay-575-million-insettlement-with-u-s-states-idUSKCN1OR19Q [https://perma.cc/8P9V-HL47]; Jonathan Stempel
& Dena Aubin, Wells Fargo Officials Enter $240 Million Settlement over Bogus Accounts, Reuters
(Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wells-fargo-settlement/wells-fargo-officialsenter-240-million-settlement-over-bogus-accounts-idUSKCN1QI4P3 [https://perma.cc/
LUA3-KAKW].
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by governmental actors, alleged internal whistleblowers claimed that they
were ﬁred or retaliated against when they attempted to alert higher-ups
within the corporation of the fraudulent activity.6 In early 2018, one such
claim resulted in a $577,000 settlement and an order to rehire the
employee.7 The signiﬁcant failures throughout the organization’s ranks
led to an unprecedented sanction from the Federal Reserve in February
2018, which restricts the bank’s ability to grow until it improves its internal
governance and controls.8 And yet, Wells Fargo had structured its
compliance program in line with what was expected under industry
standards at the time. Indeed, as one scholar explained, “[A]t the time of its
massive fake accounts scandal . . . Wells Fargo had a robust, [Organizational
Sentencing] Guidelines-based compliance program with all of the ‘expected’
tools aimed at eliminating typical compliance lapses. Yet the company was
unable to foresee, let alone prevent, an extreme compliance failure . . . .”9
Likewise, General Motors failed to recognize and prevent an extreme
compliance failure of a different sort, one that not only cost the
organization billions of dollars, but also resulted in the deaths of at least
124 people.10 In 2014, General Motors announced a recall of over seventeen
million vehicles worldwide, over eleven million of which cited issues of the
ignition switch that would abruptly cause the car to lose power “when keys
[were] accidentally bumped or moved out of the ‘Run’ position.”11 In
instances where the switch failed and the car stalled, airbags would not
deploy, creating the potential for serious injuries to both drivers and
6. Matt Egan, More Wells Fargo Workers Allege Retaliation for Whistleblowing, CNN
(Nov. 7, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/11/06/investing/wells-fargo-retaliationwhistleblower/index.html [https://perma.cc/RNF2-F7FT]. For Wells Fargo’s legal assessment
of alleged retaliation against whistleblowers, see Indep. Dirs. of the Bd. of Wells Fargo & Co.,
Sales Practices Investigation Report 87 n.26 (2017), https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/
assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HT9K-TCHU] [hereinafter Wells Fargo Investigation Report].
7. C. Ryan Barber, Wells Fargo, Ending Its Appeal, Settles Whistleblower’s $577K
Retaliation Case, Nat’l L.J. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/sites/
nationallawjournal/2018/01/19/wells-fargo-ending-its-appeal-settles-whistleblowers-577kretaliation-case/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
8. See Written Agreement Between Wells Fargo & Company and Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, supra note 4, at 8–9; Fed. Reserve Wells Fargo Press Release,
supra note 4.
9. Todd Haugh, The Power Few of Corporate Compliance, 53 Ga. L. Rev. 129, 157
(2018) [hereinafter Haugh, Power Few] (footnote omitted).
10. Kirsten Korosec, Ten Times More Deaths Linked to Faulty Switch than GM First
Reported, Fortune (Aug. 24, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/24/feinberg-gm-faultyignition-switch/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Eric D. Lawrence, GM Settles Deadly
Ignition Switch Cases for $120 Million, USA Today (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/cars/2017/10/20/gm-settles-deadly-ignition-switch-cases-120-million/777831001/
[https://perma.cc/AFS8-CJ65].
11. Peter Valdes-Dapena & Tal Yellin, GM: Steps to a Recall Nightmare, CNN, https://
money.cnn.com/infographic/pf/autos/gm-recall-timeline/index.html [https://perma.cc/
4BWX-PUXY] (last visited Oct. 8, 2019).
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passengers.12 Notwithstanding this signiﬁcant risk, the company chose not
to ﬁx the faulty switches, despite ﬁrst receiving reports on the issue in 2004,
and multiple reports thereafter.13 Indeed, when General Motors ﬁrst
analyzed the issue, it improperly classiﬁed the problem as a customer
convenience issue instead of a safety issue, leading it to determine that it
was simply too costly to make the necessary changes to the switch design.14
And over the next number of years, the company continued to
demonstrate a “lack of urgency, lack of ownership of the issue, lack of
oversight, and lack of understanding of the consequences of the problem.”15
This lack of urgency and oversight turned out to be exceptionally costly to
General Motors, both in terms of its public reputation as well as its bottom
line. In 2017, General Motors entered into a $120 million settlement with
victims of its defective ignition switch scandal, a ﬁgure that came on top of
roughly $2.5 billion worth of penalties imposed on the company.16 These
penalties included, for instance, a $900 million settlement with the DOJ in
a criminal case, and multiple other settlements with accident victims.17
When organizations fail to properly address potential compliance
failures, it presents a particularly problematic situation, because the responsibility for preventing and detecting misconduct within an organization
lies primarily with the organization itself.18 An underlying assumption of
all modern compliance efforts is that organizations are in the best position to
monitor and police the behavior of their members.19 This understanding
stems from past incidents of corporate misconduct and is uncontroversial.
For instance, when the Enron and Arthur Andersen scandals broke in
2001, they sent a ripple effect across corporate America and triggered a variety of responses from Congress, regulators, and prosecutors.20 Legislation

12. Anton R. Valukas, Jenner & Block, Report to Board of Directors of General Motors
Company Regarding Ignition Switch Recalls 1 (2014), https://www.aieg.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/08/Valukas-report-on-gm-redacted2.pdf [https://perma.cc/VB9L-5BHD].
13. Id. at 2–4.
14. Id. at 2; see also Valdes-Dapena & Yellin, supra note 11.
15. Valukas, supra note 12, at 4, 9.
16. Lawrence, supra note 10.
17. Id.
18. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2004)
(describing an “effective compliance and ethics program,” including due diligence, the
promotion of ethical conduct, and compliance with the law); see also id. ch. 8, introductory cmt.
(noting that the guidelines “provid[e] a structural foundation from which an organization may
self-police its own conduct through an effective compliance and ethics program” (emphasis added)).
19. Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 949, 959
(2009).
20. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An
Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 16–18 (2014).
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was passed.21 Enforcement priorities shifted.22 And the manner in which
corporate misconduct was settled and resolved changed dramatically.23
The focus for corporations, regulators, and prosecutors shifted to “corporate
compliance programs as the key to optimal deterrence.”24 As compliance
programs catapulted in importance, it led to the intensification of “internal
policing of corporate employees.”25 And as organizations took on this responsibility of policing their employees in an effort to comply with ever-increasing
regulatory and legal requirements, they began to focus on the structure—
the separation of work in an organization into subunits and dividing the
control of and responsibilities for the work—of the compliance programs
they created.26 Focusing on the structure of an organization’s compliance
efforts was seen as essential to ensuring an effective and robust compliance
and ethics program.27
Determining the proper structure of compliance programs has
been a question scholars, practitioners, prosecutors, and regulators have
wrestled with for decades.28 Should the compliance program be segmented
into particular subject areas or should there be one global compliance

21. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777–78
(codiﬁed at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2012)).
22. For example, within weeks of Arthur Andersen’s conviction for obstruction of
justice, then-President George W. Bush formed the President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force
within the Department of Justice. Compare United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d
281, 284 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that a guilty verdict was returned on June 15, 2002), rev’d,
544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005), with Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 11, 2002)
(establishing the task force to “investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, recover the
proceeds of such crimes, and ensure just and effective punishment of those who perpetrate
financial crimes”). For more information on the Corporate Fraud Task Force, see The
President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force, DOJ Archives, http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/
cftf/ [https://perma.cc/EKG4-VQYW] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). Under then-President Barack
Obama, the program shifted into the Interagency Financial Fraud Task Force. See Press Release,
SEC, President Obama Establishes Interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (Nov.
17, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-249.htm [https://perma.cc/NDN8ATNR]; see also Cunningham, supra note 20, at 16–17 (outlining different changes to enforcement priorities as a result of Enron and other corporate scandals).
23. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Public Interest in Corporate Settlements, 58 B.C. L.
Rev. 1483, 1498–511 (2017) (surveying the use of supervised probation, deferred prosecution
agreements, and nonprosecution agreements in addressing corporate misconduct and
collecting relevant citations).
24. Cunningham, supra note 20, at 17.
25. Id.
26. See infra section I.B.
27. See infra section I.B.
28. At a minimum, the question of how to structure a compliance program has been
an issue since the 1991 passage of the original iteration of the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines, which is applicable to corporations, partnerships, unions, funds, trusts, nonprofits,
and governmental entities. See Paula Desio, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, An Overview of the
Organizational Guidelines 2–3, https://www.hcca-info.org/Portals/0/PDFs/Resources/
Conference_Handouts/Compliance_Institute/2006/707handout.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R44R-2XGJ] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
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program?29 Should the chief compliance officer report to the general
counsel or the audit committee?30 Should compliance professionals be
embedded within particular departments or remain separate as a deterrent to
capture?31 These and other foundational questions about how organizations
should structure their compliance programs were necessary and important
progressions for creating the compliance programs found within organizations today.
Yet despite spending a great deal of time, effort, and money to enact
structural reforms and improvements within organizations’ compliance
programs, every year brings a new, more stunning example of how organizations’ attempts to reign in misconduct often fail to prevent even the most
extensive compliance failures within industries and ﬁrms. The scandals at
Wells Fargo and General Motors each reﬂect an intense failure by the
organization to effectuate its monitoring and policing responsibilities despite
the presence of compliance programs that were structured in a manner
expected to effectuate an appropriate amount of monitoring and policing.
There are a variety of accepted understandings—both within industry
and academic scholarship—about what is necessary for the creation of an
effective compliance program. However, when one considers the significant compliance failures that continue to occur despite the adoption of
increasingly sophisticated internal compliance programs, it suggests that it
may be time to affirmatively question certain understandings and assumptions
that serve as the foundation of modern-day compliance programs.32 This
Article contributes to that effort.
Compliance programs within ﬁrms focus, for good reason, on
preventing and detecting misconduct within their ranks. Those striving to
create effective ethics and compliance programs spend a great deal of time
on developing appropriate structures to house, manage, and support
compliance efforts so that they will effectively prevent and detect
wrongdoing within ﬁrms. But as demonstrated in prior work, prevention
and detection are just the ﬁrst two of four stages—the latter stages being

29. Walmart, for instance, segments its compliance department by subject area and
then by geography. Jay T. Jorgensen & C. Kevin Marshall, Corruption and Compliance:
Promoting Integrity in a Global Economy, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 425, 431–33 (2015); see also
Global Ethics & Compliance, Walmart, https://corporate.walmart.com/our-story/globalethics-compliance [https://perma.cc/HZ52-WBU5] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
30. See Michael W. Peregrine, Seeking Clarity at the Crossroads of Legal and Compliance,
Corp. Couns. (Sept. 18, 2014), https://s3-us-east-2.amazonaws.com/mwe.media/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/05161327/cc091814.pdf [https://perma.cc/GVG3-PY56].
31. See id.
32. This effort is at nascent stages but has begun. For example, Professor Todd Haugh
has recently argued that compliance programs have suffered in effectiveness because they
assume that compliance failures will fall within a normal distribution amongst one’s employees. In actuality, however, “[U]nethical employee conduct is just as likely to follow a skewed,
or ‘fat-tailed,’ distribution.” Haugh, Power Few, supra note 9, at 135 (quoting Daniel A.
Farber, Uncertainty, 99 Geo. L.J. 901, 923 (2011)).
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investigation and remediation—within compliance efforts.33 This Article
focuses on the detection and investigative stages and the continuum
between them. It demonstrates that many recent compliance failures
within organizations might have been avoided if more robust processes—
meaning the actions, practices, and routines that ﬁrms can employ to
communicate and analyze information—had been in place to ensure
investigations were conducted in a manner that allowed the ﬁrm to analyze
information from diverse areas within the ﬁrm. As such, this Article argues
that ﬁrms must focus on adopting process-based reforms that will bolster
internal investigations into complex compliance failures and act as a safety
net when compliance programs fail to detect or appropriately respond to
misconduct within ﬁrms.
Part I of this Article describes why the effort to curb corporate
criminal misconduct came to rely heavily on self-policing within the
organization, which contributed to the rise of the compliance function.
This Part goes on to demonstrate, through the use of literature from the
fields of organizational behavior and corporate governance, the importance
of implementing certain structures within the creation of compliance programs. For purposes of this Article, structure refers to a ﬁrm’s decisions on
how to organize itself.34 Part I then recounts current understandings of
compliance within legal scholarship, which include an emphasis on the
key structural components necessary for an effective compliance program
and their focus on the prevention and detection of corporate misconduct.
Part II focuses on the evolution of the compliance function. It
demonstrates that traditional compliance programs were narrow in scope,
with a focus on particular subject matter areas. Yet, the rise of more
complex organizations—organizations with many diffuse departments or
complicated organizational structures with a variety of parents and
subsidiaries—brought new challenges for compliance efforts. A complex
organization for purposes of this Article might be one organizational
entity with a number of departments, such as a university, but it may also
be a complicated corporate family with many subsidiaries, like Walmart.
These larger, more complex organizations often suffer from information
silos, which occur when departments or divisions within a large
organization are isolated from other parts of the organization.35 These

33. See Veronica Root, The Compliance Process, 94 Ind. L.J. 203, 219–27 (2019)
[hereinafter Root, Compliance Process].
34. Tor Hernes, A Process Theory of Organization 69 (2014) (citing Stewart Ranson,
Bob Hinings, and Royston Greenwood’s deﬁnition of organizational structure as “the social
structures of relationships that reside in organizations”); see also Nicola Faith Sharpe,
Process over Structure: An Organizational Behavior Approach to Improving Corporate
Boards, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 261, 266–68 (2012). But see Hernes, supra, at 69–71 (arguing that
the duality of process and structure is a fallacy).
35. Cf. Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Speciﬁc Precedents, 89 Tex. L.
Rev. 499, 510–14 (2011) (discussing effects of information silos on large government
bureaucracies in administrative agencies).
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information silos sometimes result in difficulty communicating properly
throughout the organization and, in particular, can impede a ﬁrm’s
attempts to fully and properly investigate claims of potential misconduct.
Part III sets forth the thesis of this Article and argues that ﬁrms must
focus on adopting process-based reforms that will bolster the ﬁrm’s investigations into complex compliance failures, thereby acting as a safety net
when compliance programs fail to detect or appropriately respond to
misconduct within ﬁrms. Part III begins by presenting two case studies,
which demonstrate that recent compliance failures at complex organizations suggest that many of these compliance programs—regardless of
the program’s organizational structure—suffer from information silos that
result in improper or inadequate responses to signiﬁcant organizational
misconduct. Part III then highlights how process-based reforms might
assist large, complex ﬁrms in detecting compliance failures before they
become widespread, signiﬁcant, or both. It applies speciﬁc process-based
reforms to the compliance failures at Wells Fargo and General Motors in
an effort to demonstrate how these types of additional interventions might
add value to ﬁrm compliance programs. In particular, Part III suggests the
creation of three interventions meant to bolster ﬁrms’ detection and
investigative efforts: (i) standardized internal investigation questions, (ii)
materiality surveys, and (iii) reliance upon an aggregation principles when
evaluating information. Relying on two additional case studies, Part III
then highlights two limitations to process-related reforms: organizations
without robust structural compliance programs, as evidenced by
investigations into the Catholic Church, and organizations with corrupt
cultures, as evidenced by the internal Uber sexual harassment scandal.
Part IV discusses some potential benefits raised by this Article’s proposed
framework. The Article then turns to highlighting some remaining questions.
This Article, admittedly, focuses on a relatively narrow area within compliance
efforts—failures within the detection and investigative continuum of compliance efforts within complex organizations—but shortcomings in this space
are associated with potentially devastating consequences for firms.
I. THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION
When corporate misconduct occurs, the ﬁrst questions asked often
center on how and why the organization’s compliance program failed. In
large part, the focus on compliance is a result of the ﬁrm’s self-policing
responsibilities. Firms police the conduct of their employees and agents in
an effort to ensure their compliance with legal and regulatory requirements, industry standards, and internal policies and procedures. The
earliest conceptions of the compliance function were motivated by this
policing model, with the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines admonishing ﬁrms to have effective ethics and compliance programs that would
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prevent and detect misconduct.36 When ﬁrms began developing their
internal compliance programs, they were necessarily focused on how to
structure those programs. How governance mechanisms should be
structured within ﬁrms has long been discussed within corporate governance and organizational behavior literature. Indeed, while many current
understandings of compliance within legal scholarship discuss the importance of the policing function of compliance, they also reflect the relationship
between rote compliance with legal and regulatory requirements and issues
often addressed by those charged with corporate governance.
A.

Self-Policing and the Rise of Compliance

The concept of corporate misconduct is a bit of a misnomer, because a
corporation cannot take any action on behalf of itself. Instead, the corporation’s agents act on the corporation’s behalf. Corporate misconduct, then,
consists of improper acts undertaken by a corporation’s agents that are
attributable to the corporation.37 And organizations are traditionally held
responsible for the actions of their agents, including their employees and
managers.38
As a result, one of the key challenges confronting governmental
enforcement agents is how to incentivize corporations to rein in their
employees.39 The crux of this challenge for corporations is how to encourage their employees to comply with the ﬁrms’ directives.40 This effort—the
task of monitoring one’s own agents in an attempt to prevent them from
engaging in misconduct and detect when misconduct occurs—is the act of
self-policing. And attempts to determine the mechanisms needed to
achieve effective self-policing have sparked debates within legal
scholarship and amongst policymakers for over two decades.41
While organizations have employed a variety of strategies, a principal
feature of the government’s efforts to incentivize firms to create and implement corporate compliance programs comes from the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines (Organizational Guidelines), which were promulgated in 1991.42 The Organizational Guidelines “apply to all organizations whether publicly or privately held, and of whatever nature, such as
corporations, partnerships, labor unions, pensions funds, trusts, non36. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5(f) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n
2010) (mitigating culpability of organizations based on effectiveness of existing compliance
program).
37. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687, 688 (1997).
38. Id.
39. See id. at 689–91.
40. See id. at 691.
41. See id. at 689–91.
42. John R. Steer, The Sentencing Commission’s Implementation of the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act 20 (2003), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/organizationalguidelines/selected-articles/Steer-PLI-2003.pdf [https://perma.cc/PA2U-J5J3].
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proﬁt entities, and governmental units.”43 The Organizational Guidelines
provide guidance on an appropriate sanction when ﬁrms are prosecuted
and found guilty of engaging in corporate crime of some sort.44 They are
able to incentivize organizations to create “effective compliance
programs,” because ﬁrms that are found to have one are provided
substantial mitigation credit if and when misconduct is uncovered.45 They
admonish ﬁrms to create a compliance program that is “reasonably
designed, implemented, and enforced so that [it] is generally effective in
preventing and detecting criminal conduct.”46 Thus, if an organization
fails to prevent or detect misconduct but is found to have an effective
compliance program, the sanction it will receive under the Organizational
Guidelines will be less than if it did not have an effective compliance
program.
This approach to enforcement is consistent with longstanding law and
economics scholarship. Professors Jennifer Arlen and Reinier Kraakman
explain the importance of adopting a regime that provides an incentive
for organizations to self-police through some sort of leniency credit, as
opposed to a strict liability regime that sanctions all corporate misconduct
without consideration of corporations’ attempts to rein in the actions of
their agents and employees.47
Over time, however, the real power of the Organizational Guidelines
to incentivize self-policing within ﬁrms came from their inﬂuence over the
enforcement strategies of regulators and prosecutors. For example, the
description of an effective compliance program outlined in the Organizational Guidelines was eventually “adopted by several federal regulatory
agencies and the Department of Justice.”48 Thus, organizations knew that
even if they were not found criminally liable and formally subjected to a
punishment determination under the Organizational Guidelines, it was
still to their beneﬁt to adopt effective compliance programs, because the
language from the Guidelines was directing the enforcement priorities of
several governmental actors.
When the corporate scandals of the early 2000s occurred, self-policing
was turned to yet again as an important component in the effort to decrease
corporate misconduct. In particular, governmental actors emphasized the
importance of corporate compliance programs as a tool organizations
could use to deter misconduct within their ranks.49 The goal was to create

43. Desio, supra note 28, at 2.
44. Id. at 1.
45. Steer, supra note 42, at 22; see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5(f)
(U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2010).
46. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1(a) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2013).
47. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 689–91.
48. Steer, supra note 42, at 22.
49. See Cunningham, supra note 20, at 16–17 (describing the government’s view of
compliance programs, post-Enron and the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, “as the key
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an enforcement regime that would encourage ﬁrms to engage in “internal
policing of corporate employees.”50 Thus, when Congress passed the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes–Oxley), Congress required the
“United States Sentencing Commission [to] review the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines”51 in an effort to strengthen the incentives for
organizations to develop effective compliance programs that would
encourage ﬁrms to self-police their employees and agents.
And after the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley and the corresponding
changes to the Organizational Guidelines, the enforcement strategy within
the United States saw a dramatic shift. Previous research demonstrates that
instead of focusing on bringing organizations engaged in misconduct to
trial in an attempt to achieve a guilty plea, like the case of Arthur
Andersen,52 the government began to employ a strategy in which “the
overriding goal of corporate prosecutions was to try to rehabilitate a ﬁrm’s
culture, not to punish.”53 Prosecutors and regulators began to focus on
obtaining negotiated settlement agreements—like deferred and nonprosecution agreements—as resolutions to corporate misconduct.54 Indeed,
from 2001 to 2012, sixty-three percent of companies that entered into
deferred or nonprosecution agreements were required to create a
compliance program, and thirty-ﬁve percent of such companies were
required to hire new compliance employees.55 These new strategies noted
the importance of activities beyond policing, like “chang[ing] corporate
cultures that foster criminal conduct,” but the focus on compliance efforts
targeted at preventing and detecting misconduct remained of great
importance.56
B.

The Components of a Compliance Program

As organizations confronted the challenge of mitigating particular risks
or developing a plan of remediation in response to corporate misconduct,
the reaction by firms was, and is, often to develop a compliance strategy
dependent upon the institutional design elements of structure and
to optimal deterrence, with a new emphasis on mandatory cooperation that intensiﬁed the
internal policing of corporate employees”).
50. Id. at 17.
51. David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes–Oxley and the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1781, 1783 nn.9–10 (2007) (noting that the Sentencing
Commission was already slated to review the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines prior to the
passage of Sarbanes–Oxley).
52. For a detailed account of the Arthur Andersen prosecution and subsequent appeal,
see Brandon L. Garrett, Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations
37–44 (2014).
53. Id. at 47.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 48.
56. Id. at 47–48 (quoting Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., DOJ, Remarks to the
Michigan Federal Bar Association (Oct. 5, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/
speeches/2002/100502dagremarks.htm [https://perma.cc/G8NG-ZP9H]).
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composition. Within organizational behavior literature, structure refers to
“the manner of separating the work in an organization into subunits and
dividing the control. It is usually a system of hierarchical division of control
and responsibility. Put another way, structure delimits organizational
responsibilities and communication channels, and can be both formal and
informal.”57 Relatedly, composition “often considered a subset of structure,
focuses on the demographic makeup of the members, including the mix of
insiders and outsiders, as well as their skills.”58 Lawyers and compliance
departments appear to be quite comfortable developing compliance programs that rely upon the elements of structure and its subset, composition,
in an effort to prevent and detect misconduct.
For example, Walmart’s response to alleged misconduct within its
ranks was, in large part, a response rooted in structure and composition.
After the New York Times reported alleged unlawful bribery at Walmart de
Mexico,59 Walmart instituted a “new multi-tiered structure [that]
combines many compliance areas into one global organization that
funnels reports from local compliance officers in each market up to a
[Regional Chief Compliance Officer] and then to the [International Chief
Compliance Officer] reporting to the Global” Chief Compliance Officer.60
The Global Chief Compliance Officer reports directly to the board’s audit
committee in an effort to create a uniﬁed and connected compliance
program.61 The modiﬁcations to Walmart’s compliance program since
2016, which have also included separating the compliance department
from the legal department and merging the ethics program with the
compliance program, are largely focused on structure and composition
and explicitly centered on improving the prevention and detection of
wrongdoing within its ranks.62
57. Sharpe, supra note 34, at 291 (footnotes omitted) (citing Pamela S. Tolbert & Richard
H. Hall, Organizations: Structures, Processes, and Outcomes 20, 24 (10th ed. 2009)).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., David Barstow & Alejandra Xanic von Berktrab, How Wal-Mart Used Payoffs
to Get Its Way in Mexico, N.Y. Times (Dec. 17, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/
business/walmart-bribes-teotihuacan.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); David Barstow,
Wal-Mart Hushed Up a Vast Mexican Bribery Case, N.Y. Times (Apr. 21, 2012), https://
www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/business/at-wal-mart-in-mexico-a-bribe-inquiry-silenced.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
60. See Michael Scher, Walmart Is Now the World’s Living Laboratory for Compliance,
FCPA Blog (May 21, 2014), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/5/21/walmart-is-now-theworlds-living-laboratory-for-compliance.html [https://perma.cc/4NMB-HHMM] (citation
omitted) (citing Walmart Inc., Walmart’s Global Compliance Program Report on Fiscal Year
2014, at 3, 9 (2014), https://cdn.corporate.walmart.com/44/e3/07ac7de54ab08acc97290650
ba15/2014-compliance-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD4E-NQ6B] [hereinafter 2014 Walmart
Compliance Report]).
61. Id.; see also Donna Boehme, Walmart Rolling Out Big Compliance Reforms,
Compliance Strategists Blog (Apr. 29, 2014), http://compliancestrategists.com/csblog/2014/
04/29/walmart-rolling-big-compliance-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/KX7V-EUUX].
62. I am not suggesting that Walmart has not included other important aspects in its
compliance overhaul. It appears as if it has. But the primary modiﬁcations to the compliance

262

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:249

When a compliance program focuses on the elements of structure
and composition, it provides clear, quantitative information to prosecutors, regulators, and the public about the tangible steps the ﬁrm is
taking to improve compliance. Unsurprisingly, a ﬁrm’s policing efforts are
often rooted in these concepts. A ﬁrm may create certain new committees,
for instance, to help “assign responsibility for improvements” and to clarify
communication channels—a structural reform.63 A ﬁrm may also make
prospective determinations regarding whether internal or external actors
will engage in certain compliance tasks, like conducting random audits to
ensure compliance with legal and regulatory mandates—a reform based
on composition.64 Adopting strategies like this to address, for example, the
risks associated with unlawful bribery, are reasonable and in many cases
will be beneﬁcial to the ﬁrm.
There are, however, a number of debates about how ﬁrms should
structure their organizations. For example, should the compliance
program be segmented into particular areas or should there be one global
compliance program?65 Should the chief compliance officer report to the
general counsel or the audit committee?66 Should compliance professionals be embedded within particular departments or remain separate to
deter against capture?67 These questions have been the subject of study
and reasoned inquiry for at least a decade, revealing that ﬁrms are still
attempting to determine the best structures necessary for creating an
effective compliance program that will prevent and detect misconduct and
appease enforcement authorities in the event of failure.
Yet, in addition to structure and composition, there is a third
component available for those charged with designing compliance programs—process. The organizational behavior literature discussing the
program highlighted by Walmart in its annual compliance reports appear to focus primarily
on structure and composition. See 2014 Walmart Compliance Report, supra note 60, at 2–
4; Doug McMillon, Global Ethics & Compliance Program Report, Walmart (Apr. 20, 2016),
https://corporate.walmart.com/global-responsibility/global-compliance-program-report-onﬁscal-year-2016 [https://perma.cc/CYP8-T9UZ] [hereinafter 2016 Walmart Compliance
Report].
63. For example, in 2014, Walmart “establish[ed] a Compliance and Ethics Committee in
each of the company’s international retail markets,” with the purpose of providing an
opportunity to regularly “discuss current issues relating to integrity and compliance, to assign
responsibility for improvements and review progress on past assignments, and to ensure
appropriate accountability.” 2014 Walmart Compliance Report, supra note 60, at 6–7.
64. For example, in 2016, Walmart “partnered with external experts to develop a
methodology for proactively auditing a sample of [its] third-party partners in [its] higherrisk markets.” 2016 Walmart Compliance Report, supra note 62.
65. See infra section III.A.2 (discussing criticism of Wells Fargo for employing a
decentralized structure and documenting its moves toward a centralized organizational
structure).
66. See Peregrine, supra note 30 (noting survey results indicating “that for a majority
of respondents the compliance officer reports to someone (e.g., the CEO) or something
(e.g., the board) other than the general counsel”).
67. See id.
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importance of process is quite extensive.68 If structure is about things like
the division of work as reﬂected in an organizational chart, one might
deﬁne process as the “actions, practice[s], or routines” undertaken by
members of the ﬁrm.69 In 1992, process was described by one scholar as
having three meanings: “(1) a logic that explains a causal relationship
between independent and dependent variables, (2) a category of concepts
or variables that refers to actions of individuals or organizations, and (3) a
sequence of events that describes how things change over time.”70 Building
upon work from organizational behavior literature, in 2012, Professor
Nicola Faith Sharpe articulated a deﬁnition of process targeted at
corporate governance reforms studying the performance of boards of
directors at ﬁrms. In particular, she explained that “[w]hen a board adopts
a particular sequence of steps (a process) in response to the ﬁrm’s
endogenously determined needs and goals, it is better situated to improve
its efficacy and thereby overall ﬁrm performance.”71 In providing this
deﬁnition, she identiﬁed “process as an intermediate step, linking major
board reforms to an increased likelihood of ﬁrm success.”72 While her
work centered on the role of corporate boards and corporate governance
reforms, her deﬁnition can be extended further to the ﬁeld of compliance,
which is strongly related to corporate governance efforts.73 Thus, for
purposes of this Article, process refers to the actions, practices, and
routines ﬁrms employ to communicate and analyze information necessary
for creating an effective ethics and compliance program.
While these three components—structure, composition, and process—
are presented here separately, they are inherently connected.74 Indeed, one
ﬁnds all three within descriptions of compliance efforts within ﬁrms. For
example, Professor Donald Langevoort articulated a framework that
characterizes the important components of compliance programs, including:
(1) a commitment from senior leadership to the task, setting a right
“tone at the top;” (2) delegation of authority to officials with distinct
compliance responsibilities and the resources to do their task; (3) firmwide education and training about both the substance and process of
compliance; (4) informational mechanisms to alert as to suspicious
68. See Sharpe, supra note 34, at 291–303 (analyzing the benefits of adopting a processoriented approach in order to improve the efficiency of a corporate board of directors).
69. Hernes, supra note 34, at 69.
70. Sharpe, supra note 34, at 295 n.183 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Andrew H. Van de Ven, Suggestions for Studying Strategy Process: A Research Note, 13
Strategic Mgmt. J. 169, 169 (1992)).
71. Id. at 297.
72. Id.
73. Cunningham, supra note 20, at 14–15 (highlighting the importance of a
corporation’s compliance program in reducing potential criminal liability following the
formation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission).
74. See Hernes, supra note 34, at 67–71 (“In this [book’s] view, structure is not seen
as separate from process; on the contrary, it belongs to process, much as process belongs to
structure.”).
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activity (e.g., whistleblowing procedures); (5) audit and surveillance
tactics to detect compliance failures or risks; and (6) internal investigation, response, discipline and remediation so as to learn and adjust
when failures occur.75
One can find elements of structure, composition, and process within this
framework, and these elements are found elsewhere within legal scholarship.
C.

Scholarly Understandings of Compliance

The emphasis on compliance within the enforcement efforts of the
government when confronted with corporate misconduct has required
academics, policymakers, governmental actors, and the public to begin to
study and understand compliance. While there is a great deal of commonality in the understanding of the compliance function, there are some
differences. Yet even within these differences, one can identify the importance scholars have attributed to the above components within compliance
programs.
For example, one scholar argues that the government began to use
compliance as a mechanism for the government to “dictate[] how ﬁrms
must comply [with legal and regulatory requirements], imposing speciﬁc
governance structures expressly designed to change how the ﬁrm conducts
its business.”76 As such, some view compliance requirements as coming
directly from governmental “prosecutions and regulatory enforcement
actions.”77 Other scholars have focused on the inﬂuence of legal and
regulatory requirements on the creation of compliance programs.
Professor Miriam Baer deﬁnes compliance as “a system of policies and
controls that organizations adopt to deter violations of law and to assure
external authorities that they are taking steps to deter violations of law.”78
Many scholars, however, have noted that factors outside of rote
compliance with legal and regulatory requirements have impacted ﬁrms
when creating compliance programs. For example, Baer goes beyond the
notions of prevention and detection and claims “[t]he common justification
for corporate compliance programs is that they deter wrongdoing and
generate ethical norms within the firm.”79 In order to achieve both deterrence and norm generation, Baer states “most corporate compliance
departments include both policy-setting and investigatory functions.”80
Professor Geoffrey Miller deﬁnes compliance similarly, describing it as the
manner “by which an organization seeks to ensure that employees and
75. Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 933, 939
(2017) (footnote omitted).
76. Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 2075, 2078 (2016).
77. Id.
78. Baer, supra note 19, at 958.
79. Id. at 959 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 960.
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other constituents conform to applicable norms—which can include
either the requirements of laws or regulations or the internal rules of the
organization.”81 Professor Sean Griffith deﬁnes compliance as “the means
by which ﬁrms adapt their behavior to [legal, regulatory, and social]
constraints,” noting that compliance is “the set of internal processes used
by ﬁrms to adapt behavior to applicable norms.”82 Compliance programs
are also deﬁned by Professor Todd Haugh as an “attempt to deter
corporate wrongdoing by ‘generating social norms that champion lawabiding behavior.’”83 Finally, my own account explains that “[c]ompliance
refers to a ﬁrm’s effort to ensure that it and its agents adhere to legal and
regulatory requirements, industry practice, and the ﬁrm’s own internal
policies and norms.”84
When scholars turn to concerns like the creation of “ethical norms”
and compliance with “internal rules” or “industry practice,” they recognize,
sometimes explicitly but at other times implicitly, the different ways in
which the fields of organizational behavior and corporate governance relate
to compliance efforts within ﬁrms. Inherent within all discussions about
the creation of effective ethics and compliance programs is a concern
about how those programs will be structured within an organization and
the processes by which the compliance function will be effectuated.
*

*

*

As reﬂected above, the impact formal legal interventions have had on
the creation of compliance programs and the rise of their importance is
without question. Additionally, the compliance effort has been greatly
impacted by insights from the ﬁelds of corporate governance and organizational behavior.85 Thus, it is no wonder that concerns about (i) how to
81. Geoffrey Parsons Miller, The Law of Governance, Risk Management, and
Compliance 3 (2014).
82. Griffith, supra note 76, at 2082. As Griffith explains, “[T]he scope of compliance
is greater than the enforcement of law and regulation. Compliance officers also administer
corporate ‘ethics’ policies on a wide variety of subjects. Other soft standards such as ‘reputation risk’ also come within the ambit of the contemporary compliance function.” Id.
(footnote omitted). “Because any signiﬁcant scandal or wrongdoing associated with the
business can be and often is characterized as a ‘compliance failure,’ the compliance
function effectively assumes general responsibility for business conduct consistent with
social norms.” Id. at 2082–83. Additionally, since “conduct that violates social norms can
also lead to signiﬁcant losses, the compliance function may be seen to overlap signiﬁcantly
with risk management. . . . Compliance may thus be seen as a risk or control function, the
core mission of which is to minimize downside risk associated with misconduct.” Id. at 2083
(footnote omitted).
83. Todd Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1215,
1221 (2017) (quoting Baer, supra note 19, at 960).
84. Root, Compliance Process, supra note 33, at 205.
85. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 76, at 2077–78; Sharpe, supra note 34, at 263–65;
Zhong Xing Tan, Stewardship in the Interests of Systemic Stakeholders: Re-Conceptualizing
the Means and Ends of Anglo-American Corporate Governance in the Wake of the Global
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structure compliance programs, (ii) the proper composition of compliance
frameworks, and (iii) the processes necessary to facilitate the compliance
function are similarly emphasized within compliance. Indeed, these questions
have become of even more importance as compliance programs have evolved
over time.
II. CHALLENGES WITHIN COMPLIANCE EFFORTS
One of the biggest challenges facing an organization is how to design
its compliance program. As one scholar has noted, “[A]n effective
compliance program” is what “a rational, proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm would
establish if it faced an expected sanction equal to the social cost of
violations.”86 Other scholars have proposed a compliance model that
“weigh[s] the tradeoffs between investment in compliance and risk of noncompliance” and “create[s] the possibility [for] effective compliance [to]
be a source of competitive advantage over rivals.”87 The model “shows how
ﬁrms decide whether—and to what extent—to comply along a compliance
‘frontier’ in order to optimize the relative beneﬁts of compliance to the
ﬁrm relative to cost, thereby minimizing avoidable costs resulting from
inefficient deployment of ﬁrm resources.”88 In other words, organizations
must make a series of choices when determining what to include within
their compliance programs.
Compliance programs often focused on speciﬁc subject matter areas,
but organizations today have increased in both size and scope, which has
complicated the effort to create effective compliance programs. Whether
it is one organization consisting of many independent departments or a
sophisticated organizational structure with a variety of related parents and
subsidiaries—the scope of compliance today has become much more
complex. Recognizing this complexity, some ﬁrms are attempting to
implement new structural components within their compliance programs
in an effort to improve their effectiveness. Scandals, however, continue to
occur. Yet when one reviews the results of after-the-fact investigations, a
common ﬂaw is revealed. Speciﬁcally, there is often a failure to share
information across organizational units, leading to the creation of information silos. These silos damage compliance efforts because they impede
a ﬁrm’s effort to prevent, detect, and, importantly for purposes of this

Financial Crisis, 9 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 169, 195–98 (2014) (discussing the deﬁciencies of board
structure with regards to risk management concerns).
86. Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs, in
Research Handbook on Corporate Crime and Financial Misdealing 247, 261 (Jennifer Arlen ed.,
2018).
87. This is a simpliﬁed account of the relevant model. Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim
Park, Turning Corporate Compliance into Competitive Advantage, 19 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 285,
293, 304 (2017).
88. Id. at 289.
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Article, fully investigate the nature and scope of misconduct within the
organization.
A.

Subject Matter Speciﬁc Compliance

The earliest compliance efforts targeted particular areas of risk or
legal mandates. For example, anti-money laundering compliance ﬁnds its
origins in the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.89 Under the Act, banks must “(i)
develop internal policies, procedures, and controls; (ii) designate a
compliance officer to oversee the bank’s efforts; (iii) provide training to
employees on an ongoing basis in an effort to prevent money laundering;
and (iv) implement an independent audit function to test the effectiveness
of the bank’s programs.”90 And the requirement to engage in anti-money
laundering compliance has persisted over time. Indeed, in 2018, U.S.
Bancorp entered into a $613 million settlement with the DOJ “over
charges that it willfully failed to have an adequate anti-money-laundering
program.”91
Additionally, when organizations enter into settlements with
governmental actors to resolve allegations of misconduct, they are often
required to develop or strengthen subject matter compliance programs.92
For example, in 2017, a Chilean chemicals and mining company, Sociedad
Química y Minera de Chile, entered into a deferred prosecution
agreement with the government to resolve allegations that it made
improper payments to vendors associated with government officials. 93
As part of the settlement, the company agreed to “implement a
compliance and ethics program designed to prevent and detect violations
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and other applicable anticorruption laws throughout its operations.”94
Focusing on speciﬁc legal and regulatory areas when creating
compliance programs, particularly at the outset of the phenomenon,
89. See Geoffrey P. Miller, supra note 86, at 249 (citing Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C.
§ 5318(h)(1) (2012)).
90. Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 1003, 1010–
11 (2017) [hereinafter Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives] (footnotes omitted).
91. Pete Schroeder, U.S. Bancorp to Pay $613 Million for Money-Laundering Violations,
Reuters (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-usbancorp/u-s-bancorp-to-pay613-million-for-money-laundering-violations-idUSKCN1FZ1YJ [https://perma.cc/V7GDERLQ].
92. See Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, supra note 90, at 1033–36
(explaining that government enforcement actions focus on incentivizing compliance with
particular regulatory areas, which then incentivizes organizations to focus on one regulatory
area at a time).
93. Press Release, DOJ, Chilean Chemicals and Mining Company Agrees to Pay More than
$15 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges (Jan. 13, 2017), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chilean-chemicals-and-mining-company-agrees-pay-more-15-millionresolve-foreign-corrupt [https://perma.cc/7HU5-BWCH].
94. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 9, United States v. Sociedad Química y Minera
de Chile, S.A., No. 1:17-cr-00013-TSC (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2017).
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would seem to have a variety of potential beneﬁts. First, the ﬁrm could
develop expertise in the area, which might make it more effective at
deterring improper conduct. Second, the ﬁrm might be able to engage in
more accurate risk assessments based on the behavior of the relevant
government enforcement agent and past enforcement activity. Third, the
firm would have the opportunity to create training programs for employees
to ensure compliance. Indeed, subject matter speciﬁc programs might
even be perceived by some as relatively simple to create and implement. A
particular statute or regulation would seem to have concrete boundaries
and norms, allowing the ﬁrm to properly assess the requirements outlined
therein.
The reality, however, is that even within compliance programs that
focus upon particular subject matter areas, creating an effective compliance
program is often not a straightforward task in today’s environment. Over
time, organizations have become more complex and this complexity has
transformed the challenges faced by those charged with creating compliance
programs.
B.

Increasingly Complex Organizations

Organizations today look quite different than organizations from ﬁfty
years ago, which has impacted the development of compliance programs.
The sheer size and scope of organizations has changed dramatically.
Instead of having an organization with a relatively discrete scope that sells
particular goods or services, there are more and more large, multinational
conglomerates with a variety of corporate forms, parents, and subsidiaries.95 Additionally, these larger organizations often have complicated
contractual relationships with other vendors, which can trigger additional
regulatory and legal liability.96 And even when you do have an organization
that has retained a particular niche, it often has large departments that
function with high levels of autonomy and distinction from each other.
Examples of each of these phenomena abound.
1. Increased Size and Scope. — Banks in both 1960 and 2017 were
required to develop anti-money laundering compliance programs. Banks,
however, have changed quite a bit over time. In 1960, there were approximately 13,000 independent banks within the United States.97 By 2005, the
95. See, e.g., Brian Roach, Corporate Power in a Global Economy 3 (2007), https://
www.economicsnetwork.ac.uk/sites/default/ﬁles/Brian%20Roach/Corporate_Power_in_a
_Global_Economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PMG-SUAB] (suggesting that the number of
multinational corporations (MNCs) “has increased considerably in recent years, more than
doubling since 1990, when there were about 35,000 MNCs”).
96. See, e.g., Rebecca Perry, The Legal Department’s New Nightmare: Your Vendors,
ACC Docket (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.accdocket.com/articles/the-legal-department-snew-nightmare-your-vendors.cfm [https://perma.cc/R3QD-Q7XX] (describing third-party
risk for corporations based on third-party vendor data privacy protection practices).
97. Hubert P. Janicki & Edward Simpson Prescott, Changes in the Size Distribution of
U.S. Banks: 1960–2005, 92 Fed. Res. Bank Rich. Econ. Q. 291, 291 (2006).
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number of banks dropped to about 6,500.98 Additionally, “In 1960, the ten
largest banks held 21 percent of the banking industry’s assets. By 2005, this
share had grown to almost 60 percent.”99 Thus, while anti-money laundering compliance has remained a priority over time, for the ten largest
banks, the scope of their work increased nearly threefold.
These larger banks have tremendous power to do harm within the
ﬁnancial markets, as seen throughout the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.100 Indeed,
the lending policies of these larger banks, paired with improper foreclosure
practices, have led to significant sanctions from the government and costly
investigative and remediation efforts.101 The harm caused from the banks’
actions was not only to individual consumers, but also to the country as a
whole.102
2. Multinational Conglomerates. — Walmart’s response to an alleged
bribery scheme led it to assess how its complicated organizational form
should be structured to maximize the effectiveness of its compliance
effort. In particular, Walmart determined it was necessary to adopt a
Global Compliance Program, with a signiﬁcant portion of its efforts
focused on anticorruption policies and procedures.103 This program
applies across the entire Walmart organization, but is broken down more
practically into subgroups based on region (United States and international),
e-commerce operations, and retail and sourcing markets.104 Subsidiaries
beneath each of these four subgroups then report up to their respective
organizational area.105
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Robert Lenzner, The 2008 Meltdown and Where the Blame Falls, Forbes (June 2,
2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2012/06/02/the-2008-meltdown-andwhere-the-blame-falls/#ef1713da72a5 [https://perma.cc/BL89-6SHY].
101. See, e.g., Correcting Foreclosure Practices, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
https://www.occ.gov/topics/consumer-protection/foreclosure-prevention/correctingforeclosure-practices.html [https://perma.cc/TL5J-8JGM] [hereinafter Correcting Foreclosure
Practices] (last updated Jan. 31, 2017); Independent Foreclosure Review, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., https://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerscommunities/independentforeclosure-review.htm [https://perma.cc/D59V-5P6V] [hereinafter Independent Foreclosure
Review] (last updated Aug. 30, 2019); see also Root, Compliance Process, supra note 33, at 235–
38; Veronica Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33 Yale J. on Reg. 109, 110–13 (2016) (describing
the “Independent Foreclosure Review” as a “modern-day monitorship”).
102. See Correcting Foreclosure Practices, supra note 101 (“Under the Independent
Foreclosure Review (IFR) Payment Agreement, more than $3.2 billion was distributed to
more than 3.6 million eligible borrowers . . . . In June 2016, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) escheated approximately $270 million to state authorities . . . .”);
Independent Foreclosure Review, supra note 101 (“The mortgage servicers reached an
agreement in principle with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to provide approximately $10 billion in cash
payments and other assistance to help borrowers.”).
103. See 2014 Walmart Compliance Report, supra note 60, at 2–3; Scher, supra note 60.
104. 2014 Walmart Compliance Report, supra note 60, at 3.
105. Id.
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Structurally, the global chief compliance officer now reports to the
board’s audit committee.106 In order to create a uniﬁed and connected
compliance program, “Walmart’s new multi-tiered structure . . . combines
many compliance areas into one global organization that funnels reports
from local compliance officers in each market up to a [Regional Chief
Compliance Officer] and then the [International Chief Compliance
Officer] reporting to the Global [Chief Compliance Officer] connected to
the audit committee.”107 Additionally, compliance and ethics executives
now meet with the chief executive in each international market to discuss
issues and progress in that region as part of Walmart’s compliance and
ethics committees.108 To ensure the changes are effectively implemented,
Walmart has tied certain compliance outcomes with its top executives’
compensation.109
Further, the legal department is now separated from compliance.110
To enable the global compliance program to be successful, Walmart also
added personnel and clariﬁed roles within compliance.111 And from 2014
to 2016, Walmart invested more than $125 million in new ethics and
compliance systems and upgrades to old systems.112
In 2016, Walmart merged its global ethics and compliance
programs.113 Walmart believed the merger was appropriate because the

106. Scher, supra note 60.
107. Id.; see also 2014 Walmart Compliance Report, supra note 60, at 2–3 (noting that
the CCO reports “directly” to the Audit Committee and that each regional officer reports
to the international CCO). Jay Jorgensen, Walmart’s executive vice president and global
chief ethics and compliance officer, commented, “The chief compliance officer can’t be
buried in the organization. She can’t be wearing half a hat.” Boehme, supra note 61.
Jorgensen recognized that a culture emphasizing integrity is not sufficient in a large
corporation:
Even with excellent training, not every employee will handle each
situation the right way. Accordingly, we must have processes to monitor
our performance and to provide correction where needed. Finally, we must
provide mechanisms for allegations of wrongdoing to be appropriately
reported, investigated and resolved. Only through these types of processes can
the cultural desire to act appropriately be realized across a wide group.
Jay T. Jorgensen, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Turns 40: “Reﬂections on Walmart’s
Enhanced Ethics and Compliance Program,” 5 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 237, 250 (2017).
108. Scher, supra note 60; see also 2014 Walmart Compliance Report, supra note 60, at 6.
109. See 2014 Walmart Compliance Report, supra note 60, at 2.
110. Scher, supra note 60. This is beneficial as it prevents the legal department’s “defend
and protect” mandate from contradicting the compliance department’s mandate to “seek, find
and fix the problem.” Boehme, supra note 61.
111. 2014 Walmart Compliance Report, supra note 60, at 3.
112. 2016 Walmart Compliance Report, supra note 62. Walmart now utilizes technology
systems that “screen third parties for corruption risk” and monitor and track “remediation of
compliance issues identified by the company’s compliance monitors.” Scher, supra note 60.
113. 2016 Walmart Compliance Report, supra note 62.
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“functions are closely related, as both are involved in identifying and
preventing risks, responding to issues, and educating associates.”114
3. Contractual Relationships. — An organization’s corporate compliance responsibilities also extend beyond the organization itself—to other
contracting parties. Policing third parties, while difficult, is necessary, and
the basis for such policing is typically established contractually. For
instance, both Clorox and Oracle police their contracting partners though
a partner code of conduct.115 A partner code of conduct lays out the
organization’s standards of practice, details the expectations for the
third party, and may even impose a heightened standard, as Oracle’s
does, “where local laws are less restrictive than [the] Code.”116 Similarly,
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) also utilizes a partner code of conduct with
a heightened standard.117
Apart from simply requiring third parties to sign such a code, the
organization must also then provide a means for monitoring its
compliance. To accomplish this, Oracle, for example, includes speciﬁc
mechanisms in its code of conduct for reporting violations and states that
such violations can be “the basis for [an] immediate termination” of the
relationship.118 Likewise, PwC requires its partners to report and “raise
concerns” to the appropriate designee, and then promises to
“review/investigate reported concerns and escalate [them] to Third
Parties to be managed and investigated.”119 When necessary, PwC then
requires its third party to execute a remediation plan or alternatively may
simply suspend or terminate the contractual relationship.120
These contractual relationships are often mentioned explicitly when
compliance failures are settled with the government. When ﬁrms enter
into settlement agreements, they often agree to ensure the compliance not
only of themselves but also of their business partners. For example, when
Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile agreed to implement an FCPA
compliance program through its operations, the scope of operations
included “its affiliates, agents, and joint ventures.”121 It also agreed to

114. Id.
115. Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, supra note 90, at 1016–17.
116. Id. at 1017 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Oracle, Partner Code of
Conduct and Business Ethics 2, http://www.oracle.com/partners/en/how-to-do-business/opnagreements-and-policies/019520.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R53-RWUA] (last visited Jan. 31,
2017)).
117. PwC not only is a signatory to the U.N. Global Compact but also expects their
contracting parties to comply with their code of conduct as well. PwC, Global Third Party Code
of Conduct 2 (2018), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/about-pwc/assets/3rd-party-code-ofconduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/588D-LBAD].
118. Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, supra note 90, at 1017 (quoting
Oracle, supra note 116, at 2).
119. PwC, supra note 117, at 3.
120. Id.
121. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 94, at 9–10.
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ensure that its “contractors and subcontractors” maintain compliance with
the FCPA.122
4. Large, Autonomous Departments. — Finally, some organizations,
such as universities, utilize a more siloed business structure. A university
typically has one primary unit, with a number of autonomous departments
and schools underneath its umbrella. The degree of coordination between
the different stakeholders in such a setting varies depending on the
organization, but coordinating compliance can certainly be a challenge
regardless of size or structure. For instance, in the Title IX context, both
the Title IX coordinator and department (if applicable) are to be
independent from the rest of the organization.123 This independence is
desirable in order to avoid any real or perceived conﬂicts of interest, and
extends not only to the structuring of the department but also to the very
selection of the Title IX coordinator, who may have conﬂicting
responsibilities if actively involved in another on-campus role.124 Despite
this desire and need for independence, however, universities must
maintain and ensure compliance across autonomous units, including the
Title IX department.125
*

*

*

Today’s complex organizations have difficult and important choices
to make when structuring their compliance programs. They can focus on
discrete regulatory areas or they can adopt global compliance programs.
They can attempt to complete tasks in house, or they can take on the
responsibility of the conduct of their contractual partners. Whatever a
ﬁrm’s choice, they remain responsible for the conduct of their organizational members and partners.126 For complex organizations, one of the
biggest challenges they face is how to manage the ﬂow of information
between these various organizational units.
C.

Information Silos

There are many reasons why an organization might rationally attempt
to limit information to a certain segment of the ﬁrm. For example, one of
the Big Four accounting ﬁrms may limit information between its divisions
responsible for auditing and consulting.127 Similarly, a law ﬁrm might
122. Id. at 10.
123. Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of
Educ. 2–3 (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague201504-title-ix-coordinators.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4KG-VPQV].
124. Id.
125. See id. at 4–7.
126. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23
J. Legal Stud. 833, 838–40 (1994).
127. See Craig Mellow, Auditing the Auditors, Global Fin., July 17, 2018,
https://www.gfmag.com/magazine/julyaugust-2018/auditing-auditors [https://perma.cc/
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screen off individuals with potential conﬂicts of interest, so that it can
represent a client without violating ethical norms.128 And a bank may
determine it must maintain separation between certain divisions to ensure
compliance with the law.129 There are other instances, however, when
obstructions to the free ﬂow of information within an organization are
neither purposeful nor healthy.130
An “information silo” or the “silo effect,” within the world of business
and management, refers to the “propensity of departments or divisions
within a large organization to become isolated, with a resulting failure to
communicate and pursue common goals.”131 For those charged with designing compliance programs, silos have the potential to be particularly
dangerous. If individuals at a subsidiary in Mexico are bribing foreign officials,
it may be well-known within the confines of that subsidiary, but it may not be
known at the parent company, which will be held responsible for the conduct.
One of the most notorious illustrations of a harmful silo within an
organization is that of the London unit of A.I.G., a 377-person office,
known as A.I.G. Financial Products.132 The London unit’s participation in
and reliance on credit default swaps “nearly decimated one of the world’s
H8UQ-KV2Z] (discussing the beneﬁts of “Chinese wall[s]” between auditing and consulting
departments within the Big Four).
128. See Dennis P. Duffy, Nat’l Emp’t Law Inst., Conflicts of Interest 8–11 (2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2017/11/conference/
papers/Underhill-Conflicts%20of%20Interest–Ethics%20Issues.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZXW9PPTK].
129. See John Cunningham & Crystal Jezierski, Independence Day: The Separate
and Equal Compliance Department, Glob. Compliance News (June 26, 2015), https://
globalcompliancenews.com/independence-day-the-separate-and-equal-compliance-department/
[https://perma.cc/BY4Y-UHRM] (discussing the common perception that compliance
programs must have sufficient “autonomy from management” in order to be effective under the
law (emphasis omitted)).
130. See, e.g., Five Things to Consider When Realigning Responsibilities to the First Line of
Defense, Treliant Talks (Oct. 31. 2018), https://soundcloud.com/treliant/ﬁve-things-toconsider-when-realigning-responsibilities-with-the-first-line-of-defense (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (speaking with Chief Compliance Officer of PNC, Mike Little, about how his
company moved from siloed roles and responsibilities to a system in which compliance roles were
defined and laid out across all lines of defense).
131. Levy & Glicksman, supra note 35, at 510; see also Steven Alter, Overcoming Silo
Thinking in the IS Discipline by Thinking Differently About IS and IT 1 (2015),
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Overcoming-Silo-Thinking-in-the-IS-Discipline-byIS-Alter/b612c7d36795b9f02b4303ab8dda82c0effbed5c [https://perma.cc/YV8J-DEN6]; Jean
Egmon, Bridging Silos: A Proven Method for Effective Business Collaboration 1–2, https://
www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/~/media/Files/initiatives/kale/KALE-Bridging-Silos.ashx
[https://perma.cc/3232-CECX] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019); Vijay Govindarajan, The First Two
Steps Toward Breaking Down Silos in Your Organization, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Aug. 9, 2011),
https://hbr.org/2011/08/the-first-two-steps-toward-breaking-down-silos (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
132. Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer’s Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y.
Times (Sept. 27, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/business/28melt.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
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most admired companies, a seemingly sturdy insurer with a trillion-dollar
balance sheet, 116,000 employees and operations in 130 countries.”133 The
London “unit’s revenue rose to $3.26 billion in 2005 from $737 million in
1999.”134 This enormous growth was attributable to its entry into the credit
default swap market, but during the market downturn of 2007–2008, the
tides shifted. The London unit was forced to recognize a $352 million
unrealized loss on its credit default swap portfolio for the quarter that
ended on September 30, 2007.135 Yet, it continued to maintain “that its risk
assessments were reliable and its portfolios conservative.”136 In February
2008, auditors identiﬁed a number of problems with A.I.G.’s accounting
regarding the credit default swaps.137 Eventually, the losses within the
London unit became untenable, resulting in devastating consequences
not only for A.I.G. but also the global ﬁnancial markets.138 Because the
London unit was able to operate on its own, others within A.I.G. failed to
understand the nature of the business going on, making it a classic
example of an information silo. And the effects were nothing short of
devastating for the ﬁrm and the market.
Importantly, examples of silos abound both within private organizations139 and the government. Indeed, in prior work, I demonstrate that
when a corporation commits repeat offenses, it is treated as a recidivist and
levied with a heightened sanction when appearing before the same
government enforcement agent, but not when appearing before different
governmental enforcement agencies.140 This ﬁnding holds even when the
underlying misconduct is quite similar, like the case of unlawful bribery.141
When the government fails to work past its own inherent silos, it fails to
create a robust set of incentives for corporations to identify systemic
failures within their compliance programs.
D. Limited Investigations
When today’s larger and more complex organizations fail to
communicate across organizational units, it has the potential to create
tangible harm to the firm. In prior work, I demonstrated that there are four
stages within the compliance process—prevention, detection, investigation,

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Dennis R. Beresford, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach & C.B. Rogers, Jr., Report of
Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of WorldCom, Inc.
1, 218 (Mar. 31, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723527/000093176303
001862/dex991.htm [https://perma.cc/ZTP9-Z64E].
140. Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, supra note 90, at 1054–55.
141. Id. at 1056–57.
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and remediation.142 The Organizational Guidelines, and therefore ﬁrms’
compliance programs, however, put a great deal of emphasis on the
importance of prevention and detection. As a result of this emphasis, ﬁrms
have spent millions of dollars implementing compliance programs with
structures likely to effectuate their responsibility to prevent and detect
misconduct.
The reality, however, is that many firms detect—or are aware—of
information related to misconduct, but upon commencing an investigation
of the potential wrongdoing, fail to identify that information as material or as
information that suggests the firm has a potentially significant compliance
failure brewing. The boundary between detection and investigation is one of
particular vulnerability for firms. A failure to understand the implications of
what one has detected or a failure to properly investigate potential misconduct can result in continued wrongdoing, which can lead to a much more
signiﬁcant and widespread compliance failure than if one had addressed
the problem at an earlier point in time.
For those charged with conducting investigations of potential
misconduct within a firm, information silos can have potentially devastating
effects. For example, the “collective knowledge” doctrine aggregates knowledge and states of mind within a firm.143 The existence of silos increases the
risk that a firm technically aware of information (i.e., it has detected but failed
to identify important or material information) will still be held responsible
under the collective knowledge doctrine. As such, when information
remains cordoned off, it creates the potential for liability.144 An effective
compliance program requires reliable, free ﬂows of information.
Thus, when a ﬁrm has signals pointing it to information that might
indicate a material compliance failure in some way, it is imperative that its
investigation of the potential misconduct considers and has access to all
relevant information. For complex organizations with a variety of information silos, however, it can be quite challenging for those charged with
overseeing a ﬁrm’s compliance efforts to manage these more complex
compliance investigations.
*

*

*

142. Root, Compliance Process, supra note 33, at 219–28.
143. United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (“The acts of
a corporation are, after all, simply the acts of all its employees operating within the scope of
its employment.”). The doctrine has been criticized and no longer applies in False Claims
Act cases. See United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1273–77 (D.C.
Cir. 2010). It remains applicable, however, in other areas of law. See United States v. Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co., No. 14-CR-00175, 2016 BL 240175, at *2, *4 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2016).
144. See, e.g., Sam F. Halabi, Collective Corporate Knowledge and the Federal False
Claims Act, 68 Baylor L. Rev. 265, 272–73 (2016) (discussing deterioration of information
quality as it ﬂows through organizational channels—especially from the lower rank on its
way to the top—using the Ford Pinto as a case study).
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As is shown in the examples above, an abundance of information silos
may contribute to signiﬁcant, widespread, and avoidable scandals within
complex organizations. The questions facing organizations remain: How
might they best combat the harms associated with these silos? How do they
take information they have detected about potential misconduct across
the organization and properly utilize it in their investigative methods?
III. COMPLEX COMPLIANCE INVESTIGATIONS
As explained in Parts I and II, the importance of the compliance
function within organizations is widely accepted within industries, by
governmental enforcement agents, scholars, courts, and the public.145 The
shift from small, discrete organizations to complex ones, however, has
made the task of creating effective compliance programs more
challenging. The challenge for complex organizations is, quite simply,
more complicated than what’s faced by those with a smaller footprint and
reach. As explained above, one of the reasons it is more difficult for
complex organizations to design effective compliance programs is the
reality that they are often plagued by information silos that make it
difficult to identify and assess all relevant information when investigating
the potential misconduct. A failure between the stages of detection and
investigation—either by failing to properly detect the scope of misconduct
or failing to trigger an investigation to ascertain that scope—can allow
what starts as small levels of misconduct to become widespread.
Importantly, complex organizations appear to recognize this
challenge. As such, those charged with instituting compliance programs
across diffuse corporate entities and departments actively identify mechanisms to assist them in their efforts, which can be categorized as changes
to the program’s structure, composition, or process. Because “ﬁrms are
subjected to signiﬁcant internal and external pressures to over-comply or
under-comply with regulations[,] [h]ow ﬁrms determine their allocative
efficiency and technical efficiency depends upon a given ﬁrm’s regulatory
and resource mix.”146 The goal of an organization in designing a compliance program is to create one with the right balance of structure, composition, and process to ensure that it is an effective compliance program.
Achieving this goal, however, often remains elusive.
In an effort to interrogate the ability of ethics and compliance
programs that currently meet industry standards to combat information
silos within complex organizations, this Part assesses recent compliance
failures at General Motors and Wells Fargo. Importantly, each of these
ﬁrms had adopted compliance programs that appeared effective but failed
to appropriately address the misconduct before it became signiﬁcant. This
145. See Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, supra note 90, at 1004–09
(“Compliance is king, and its subjects—regulators, prosecutors, courts, corporations, and
academics—are quick to tout its power and potential for good.”).
146. Bird & Park, supra note 87, at 312.
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is despite multiple early reports about potential wrongdoing within the
ﬁrms. The analysis suggests that currently employed ethics and
compliance programs are limited in their ability to counteract the
phenomenon of information silos. This conclusion leads to the thesis of
this Article: Complex organizations should focus on adopting processbased reforms that will bolster the ﬁrm’s investigations into complex
compliance failures, thereby acting as a safety net when compliance
programs fail to detect or appropriately respond to misconduct within
ﬁrms. This Part demonstrates how the adoption of process-related
reforms—standardized internal investigations, materiality surveys, and an
aggregation principle—might assist ﬁrms in detecting and investigating
the compliance failures within their ranks at an earlier date. This Part then
goes on to address two limitations of successful process-related reforms,
which demonstrate that to be effective, process-related reforms must be
employed within a program that has a robust structure and an ethical
culture.
A.

Silos Within Accepted Structures

As explained above, an information silo exists within an organization
when departments or a division within a large organization become
isolated, resulting in a failure to communicate and pursue common goals.
This section looks at recent scandals at organizations that appear to have
suffered from information silos—General Motors and Wells Fargo. It then
demonstrates that each organization had what appeared to be reasonable
organizational structures aimed at preventing and detecting misconduct,
yet signiﬁcant failures occurred despite awareness within the organization
of the risk that inevitably led to each scandal.
1. General Motors.147— In the mid-2000s, General Motors moved to a
global ethics and compliance program.148 As compliance has risen in
importance,149 many complex corporations have moved to creating global
ethics and compliance programs. Indeed, as early as 2015, members within
the compliance industry were noting a rise in “[g]lobal [c]ompliance
[p]rogram [t]rends.”150 These global compliance programs were enacted,
147. The description herein is meant to provide enough information to the reader to
demonstrate that information silos existed that prevented a widespread compliance failure
from being detected and properly investigated. It is not a full account of the ignition switch
failure, which can be found in the Valukas Report. See generally Valukas, supra note 12
(outlining a complete timeline of the General Motors ignition switch controversy).
148. See Root, Compliance Process, supra note 33, at 222–23 (discussing General Motors’s
failure to identify ﬂaws with its ignition switch).
149. See Deloitte, Compliance Modernization Is No Longer Optional 4 (2017) [hereinafter
Deloitte, Compliance Modernization], https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/
us/Documents/regulatory/us-compliance-modernization.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9ZP-3R5D].
150. Stephanie Gallagher, Global Compliance Program Trends, Compliance & Ethics
Blog (Apr. 16, 2015), http://complianceandethics.org/global-compliance-program-trends/
[https://perma.cc/TR7Y-U55C].
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in part, in recognition of the more complicated task facing complex
organizations when designing compliance programs.151
Additionally, General Motors put into place a variety of ﬁrm-wide
committees charged with identifying issues within its products. These
committees, again, were structured, in part, to defeat information silos within
the firm and to foster communication across departments. For example, the
General Motors’s Product Investigations group was charged with
“identifying and remedying safety issues.”152 Additionally, the Executive
Field Action Decision Committee “considers recalls and [its] members
include three [General Motors] vice presidents, including its chief
engineer.”153 These are just two of many committees within General Motors
empowered to investigate issues identiﬁed as potential problems. Thus, it
would appear that General Motors had enacted sophisticated mechanisms
in its organizational structure to ensure that its products remained safe for
consumers and that liability to the ﬁrm remained minimal.
General Motors failed, however, to detect a key ﬂaw with an ignition
switch in certain models of their car. The “ignition switch in certain
cars . . . failed to keep the car powered on . . . resulting in moving stalls on
the highway as well as loss of power on rough terrain a driver might
confront moments before a crash.”154 Most harmful, “The failure of the
switch meant that drivers were without airbag protection at the time they
needed it most.”155 Importantly, different sets of individuals within
General Motors were aware of problems with the switch. Indeed, “From
the switch’s inception to approximately 2006, various engineering groups
and committees considered ways to resolve” problems with keeping the
cars powered on, although they were unaware of the switch’s impact on
airbag deployment.156 In 2005, General Motors’s Product Investigations
group opened and closed an investigation into the ignition switch, “[F]inding
no safety issue to be remedied.”157 In 2007, a Field Performance Assessment
engineer was told to track incidents of airbag nondeployments in the
Chevrolet Cobalt. He did, but he was not given directions “about a
deliverable nor a time frame,” and he “was not aware of important
[General Motors] records of prior problems with the ignition switch.”158
“By 2011, outside counsel, privy to the . . . engineers’ data, had repeatedly
warned [General Motors] in-house counsel that [General Motors] could
be accused of egregious conduct due to its failure to address the problem
151. See Deloitte, Compliance Modernization, supra note 149, at 4 (“Silos [within
compliance programs] are out of vogue . . . . Managing compliance risk is more effective
when execution and oversight activities can be integrated . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
152. Valukas, supra note 12, at 3.
153. Id. at 11.
154. Id. at 1.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 3.
158. Id. at 8–9.
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of airbag non-deployment in the Cobalt.”159 In-house counsel eventually
ordered an investigation in 2011, but that investigation lacked urgency and
did not make headway until a plaintiff’s expert, in April 2013, made plain
the problems with the switch.160 Even after learning of the precise source
of the problem, “[I]t was not until February 2014 that [General Motors]
issued” its ﬁrst recall.161
Ultimately, by the time General Motors fully appreciated the
problems with the ignition switch and issued a recall in 2014,162 hundreds
of consumers had been impacted by their failure to detect the ﬂaw.
Indeed, the individual appointed by General Motors to oversee the GM
Ignition Compensation Claims Resolution Facility determined that 124
deaths and 275 injuries were linked to the faulty ignition switch, even
though “General Motors . . . originally said it knew of only 13 deaths
related to the switches.”163 And yet, from 2002 through 2014 when the
recall was issued,164 various employees of General Motors were aware of
issues with the switch, but failed to put the information together in a way
that alerted them to the signiﬁcance of the problem. This failure occurred
despite the fact that multiple individuals external to the organization,
including a plaintiff’s expert, a Wisconsin state trooper, and Indiana
University researchers, identiﬁed the impact the switch had on airbag
deployment and notiﬁed General Motors of that fact prior to 2014.165
Various members of General Motors had pieces of the information, but
those pieces remained siloed within particular divisions and departments.
2. Wells Fargo. — From the time Wells Fargo merged with Norwest in
1998, it utilized a decentralized corporate structure, with each line of the
business operating independently.166 In particular, risk management was
housed within each particular business unit: “Management believed that
this decentralized approach was a superior method for managing risk and
had helped make Wells Fargo successful, and in particular had helped Wells
Fargo come through the 2008 financial crisis relatively unscathed.”167
Importantly, within the industry at the time, there was nothing necessarily
wrong with this choice. By housing risk management within particular
business units, one is essentially relying upon a subject matter speciﬁc
compliance program.
Thus, in 2002, when the Community Bank at Wells Fargo detected an
increase in sales practice violations, risk management, as well as many
other important departments, was housed within that business unit. In
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 1–2.
Korosec, supra note 10.
Valukas, supra note 12, at 1–2.
Id. at 115–16.
Wells Fargo Investigation Report, supra note 6, at 60.
Id.
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response to the violations, the Community Bank created a “sales integrity
task force” to address the problem: “The task force undertook various
initiatives, including the implementation of a sales integrity training
program and certiﬁcation, the modiﬁcation of incentive plans to reduce
the promotion of undesirable behaviors and utilization of audit programs
to identify suspicious activity.”168
Wells Fargo did, however, have certain groups that operated at the
corporate level, or outside the particular business units. One such group
was Wells Fargo’s Internal Investigations group. In 2004, the Internal
Investigations group drafted a memo regarding concerning sales practice
issues, which noted an increase in violations.169 In particular, it noted “an
increase in annual sales gaming cases—defined as the manipulation and/or
misrepresentation of sales to receive compensation or meet sales goals—
from 63 in 2000 to a projected 680 in 2004.”170 Additionally, the number
of associated terminations also grew, “from 21 in 2000 to a projected 223
in 2004.”171
The problem with sales practice issues, however, continued to grow
within the Community Bank despite the information from the Internal
Investigations Group. Within the Community Bank, leadership “felt that
the associated risks could be managed appropriately by increasing
training, detecting wrongdoing and punishing wrongdoers.”172 Note that
this strategy essentially tracks the law and economics models for addressing
crime. When the costs of crime are increased through probability of
detection and the expected severity of punishment, crime is expected to
decrease.173 Unfortunately, within the Community Bank this strategy
failed.
From 2013 to 2015, the Los Angeles Times published a number of
articles on sales practice issues at Wells Fargo that triggered internal policy
changes and additional, fulsome reviews of the extent of the sales practice
violations.174 Information from these reviews made it all the way up to the
then-Chief Executive Officer and others within senior management, but
they failed to appreciate the potential severity of the information in front

168. Id. at 31.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol.
Econ. 169, 176 (1968) (“The approach taken here . . . assumes that a person commits an
offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and
other resources at other activities.”).
174. Wells Fargo Investigation Report, supra note 6, at 32, 44–45.
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of them.175 The decisionmaking authority to handle the sales practice
violations remained solely within the Community Bank.176
Thus, by 2016, Wells Fargo found itself embroiled in a signiﬁcant
scandal regarding the opening of “fake accounts” on behalf of its
customers.177 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) determined that practices at Wells Fargo created pressure on employees to
achieve certain sales goals, which ultimately led to employees engaging in
the “unauthorized opening of deposit or credit card accounts and the
transfer of funds from authorized, existing accounts to unauthorized
accounts.”178 Wells Fargo was aware of this information since at least 2002
as a result of internal reviews conducted by individuals from the separate
business units of the Community Bank, Internal Investigations, and Legal,
amongst others.179 The OCC sanctioned Wells Fargo in 2016, which
resulted in a $35 million civil penalty.180 Additionally, the OCC required
Wells Fargo to “make restitution to customers who were harmed by the
bank’s unsafe or unsound sales practices.”181 As of August 2017, Wells
Fargo indicated that its investigation “could reveal a ‘signiﬁcant increase’
in the number of accounts involved, up from the 2.1 million that it
previously estimated,”182 and indeed, further abuses were discovered,
which led the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to levy a $1 billion
ﬁne on the company in April 2018.183
Ultimately, the Board of Directors for Wells Fargo initiated an
investigation into the sales practices at the bank. The report blamed the

175. Id. at 55.
176. See id. at 47 (noting that the head of the Community Bank “reinforced a culture
of tight control over information about” sales practice violations, “[H]amper[ing] the
ability of control functions outside the Community Bank and the Board to accurately assess
the problem and work toward a solution”).
177. Jackie Wattles, Ben Geier, Matt Egan & Danielle Wiener-Bronner, Wells Fargo’s 20Month Nightmare, CNN (Apr. 24, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/04/24/news/
companies/wells-fargo-timeline-shareholders/index.html [https://perma.cc/255T-QUGD].
178. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Assesses Penalty Against
Wells Fargo, Orders Restitution for Unsafe or Unsound Sales Practices (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2016/nr-occ-2016-106.html [https://
perma.cc/3XXT-4RXX] [hereinafter OCC Press Release].
179. Wells Fargo Investigation Report, supra note 6, at 73. Within the Law Department,
deputy general counsels for the Employment Law Section and the Litigation & Workout
Division had “signiﬁcant involvement with sales integrity issues.” Id. at 72.
180. OCC Press Release, supra note 178.
181. Id.
182. Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo May Have Found More Fake Accounts Created by Employees,
N.Y. Times (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/business/dealbook/wellsfargo-fraud-accounts.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
183. Bill Chappell, Wells Fargo Hit with $1 Billion in Fines over Home and Auto Loan
Abuses, NPR (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/20/
604279604/wells-fargo-hit-with-1-billion-in-ﬁnes-over-consumer-abuses [https://perma.cc/
M6YK-SX5J].
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misconduct on a decentralized management structure.184 In particular, it
noted that the head of the Community Bank and its “group risk officer not
only failed to escalate issues outside the Community Bank, but also worked
to impede such escalation, including by keeping from the Board
information regarding the number of employees terminated for sales
practice violations.”185 These actions were not a sign of purposeful
misconduct. Instead, “[Risk officers] likely did so to give themselves
freedom to address these issues on their own terms, rather than to
encourage improper behavior.”186
In reality, Wells Fargo had both a centralized and decentralized
organizational structure. Certain functions, like risk management and
human resources, remained within particular business units and took a
decentralized structure.187 But other functions, like legal, in actuality had
a centralized structure with all reporting lines ending with a top executive
within Wells Fargo corporate.188 The result of the combination of these
various business units, departments, and divisions was that many different
people at Wells Fargo were aware of sales practice issues, but that information was not properly communicated. Wells Fargo, like General Motors,
suffered from a number of information silos. These silos allowed the
problems at Wells Fargo to grow until they resulted in a rather explosive
set of scandals for the bank.
*

*

*

In each of the above examples, legitimate decisions about how to
structure the organization led to information silos that contributed to the
failure to properly detect and investigate misconduct when it ﬁrst
occurred. As a result, the compliance failures festered and grew. To be
clear, that is not to suggest that there were no other signiﬁcant causes of
the compliance failures at issue. There were. But in each of these examples,
the employees of the organization were notified of a potential area of
misconduct or risk, and the organization failed to properly assess the
information due, at least in part, to information silos. These information silos
plagued organizations with centralized compliance and management structures—like General Motors—and those with decentralized compliance and
management structures—like Wells Fargo. This admittedly anecdotal ﬁnding
suggests that structure, while necessary, is not sufficient for the creation of
an effective ethics and compliance program. More is needed.

184. Wells Fargo Investigation Report, supra note 6, at 4.
185. Id. at 8.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 11–12.
188. See id. at 72 (explaining that the legal department at Wells Fargo is separated into
divisions, “each of which is headed by a deputy general counsel who reports to the General
Counsel”).

2020]

COMPLEX COMPLIANCE INVESTIGATIONS

283

This ﬁnding is important, in part, because structural reforms and
changes to composition are often the knee-jerk response by ﬁrms and the
government when signiﬁcant misconduct is discovered. The Wells Fargo
example makes this clear. The root cause of the misconduct at Wells Fargo
was an environment with high-pressure sales goals tied to incentive
compensation, but the root cause of the failure to detect the misconduct
appears tied to the existence of information silos within the ﬁrm. The
after-the-fact report to the Board blamed the lack of detection on Wells
Fargo’s decentralized management structure and then, in the brief
“Overview of the Report” section previewing the ﬁndings of the more
fulsome report, noted the following steps toward “Reform and
Accountability” the bank was taking:
The Board has taken numerous actions and supported management steps to address these issues. Wells Fargo has replaced and
reorganized the leadership of the Community Bank. It has also
eliminated sales goals and reformed incentive compensation.
Centralization of control functions is being accelerated. The Board
has separated the role of the Chairman and the CEO, strengthened
the charters of Board Committees and established regular reporting
to the Board by the new Office of Ethics, Oversight and Integrity. As
a result of the investigation, the Board has terminated for cause five
senior executives of the Community Bank and has imposed
forfeitures, clawbacks and compensation adjustments on senior
leaders totaling more than $180 million.189
The very clear response by the ﬁrm was to enact structural changes to its
organizational structure, but other than establishing regular reporting to
the Board by a newly created office, there has been no process-related
reform.
This is not an isolated response. Indeed, the government’s own
response focused heavily on structural reforms. For example, in 2018 the
Federal Reserve Board announced restrictions to the growth of the bank
“until it sufficiently improves its governance and controls” and required it
to replace four board members by year end.190 In particular, the Federal
Reserve Board’s “consent cease and desist order . . . requires the ﬁrm to
improve its governance and risk management processes, including
strengthening the effectiveness of oversight by its board of directors.”191
This focus on board structure to cure what ails ﬁrms, as noted by Sharpe
in 2012, is necessarily limited.192 While there are many structural reforms
that it makes sense for Wells Fargo to enter into, it also seems as if certain
189. Id. (unpaginated opening page).
190. Fed. Reserve Wells Fargo Press Release, supra note 4.
191. Id.
192. See Sharpe, supra note 34, at 297 (“This Article adds a critical dimension to the
discussion on boards by identifying process as an intermediate step, linking major board
reforms to an increased likelihood of ﬁrm success.”).
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process-related reforms may have been equally important to ensuring the
detection of the misconduct before it became widespread and signiﬁcant.
B.

Process-Based Interventions

Because complex organizations often encounter compliance failures
that cannot be addressed through changes to structure and composition
on their own, this Article argues that they should adopt process-based
reforms—actions, practices, and routines a ﬁrm can employ to
communicate and analyze information—that will bolster a ﬁrm’s investigations into complex compliance failures and act as a safety net when
compliance programs fail to detect or appropriately respond to misconduct within the ﬁrm. In particular, this Article puts forth three general
areas in which complex organizations might focus on adopting processrelated actions, practices, and routines that ﬁrms may employ to
communicate information necessary to navigate the stages of detection
and investigation within the compliance process.193 These suggestions
build upon my own empirical194 and theoretical195 research.
1. Track Similar Unlawful Behavior Within the Firm. — When ﬁrms
focus on policing and structural components of a compliance program,
they sometimes focus too heavily on particular compliance areas when
they might otherwise beneﬁt from assessing certain types of behavior. As
is explained above, they focus on particular compliance areas, in part,
because of the way enforcement actors assert their authority when resolving
instances of misconduct. But complex organizations that are serious about
creating and implementing effective compliance programs should also
consider the adoption of processes that will identify similar problematic
conduct across seemingly diverse compliance areas.
For example, since at least 2007, medical device manufacturer Biomet
has struggled to address unlawful bribery within its organization on
multiple occasions. As a result of misconduct at various subsidiaries,
Biomet has entered into actions settling claims that it paid unlawful
kickbacks to physicians in violation of the False Claims and Anti-Kickback

193. See supra section I.B.
194. See generally Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, supra note 90 (conducting
an empirical case study of FCPA enforcement actions against firms, and concluding that federal
regulators should employ a coordinated enforcement strategy to identify institutions with
systemic compliance failures).
195. See generally Root, Compliance Process, supra note 33 (proposing a new method
to evaluate compliance failures that focuses on discrete stages within the compliance
process: prevention, detection, investigation, and remediation).
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Acts in 2007196 and 2014,197 and unlawful bribery in violation of the FCPA in
both 2012198 and 2017.199 As is often the case when settling these claims, the
government incentivized Biomet to compartmentalize its compliance assessment. In particular, it emphasized the importance of Biomet “continu[ing]
to implement a compliance and ethics program designed to prevent and
detect violations of the FCPA.”200 In doing so, the DOJ emphasized the
need for Biomet to develop an FCPA compliance program “throughout
its operations, including those of its affiliates, agents, and joint ventures,
and those of its contractors and subcontractors.”201 The last decade of
misconduct at Biomet related to unlawful payments or bribery, however,
may speak less to a problem with its commitment to adhering to the FCPA
and more to its need to engage in a much broader effort to adopt processes
throughout its global compliance program targeted at stopping unlawful
payments more generally.
Many complex organizations, like Biomet, would beneﬁt from
modifying their compliance programs in an effort to address similar
unlawful behavior throughout departments and corporate entities. In this
regard, ﬁrms could harness the power of process interventions in two ways.
First, ﬁrms could adopt processes to assist them in identifying trends and
problem areas across diverse regulatory and legal areas and across
departments and entities. In doing so, ﬁrms will have improved their
decisionmaking systems by providing more relevant and necessary information needed for developing responses to particular types of misconduct
that appear to reoccur within firms. Second, once common areas of concern,
like unlawful bribery, are identified across a complex organization, a firm

196. Press Release, DOJ, Five Companies in Hip and Knee Replacement Industry
Avoid Prosecution by Agreeing to Compliance Rules and Monitoring (Sept. 27, 2007),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/usao-nj/legacy/2013/11/29/hips0927.rel.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J37F-9AJ7].
197. Press Release, DOJ, Biomet Companies to Pay over $6 Million to Resolve False Claims
Act Allegations Concerning Bone Growth Stimulators (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/biomet-companies-pay-over-6-million-resolve-false-claims-act-allegations-concerningbone [https://perma.cc/Q7RU-YBH2].
198. Press Release, DOJ, Third Medical Device Company Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act Investigation (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/third-medical-devicecompany-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation [https://perma.cc/59NR-9ALC].
199. Press Release, DOJ, Zimmer Biomet Holdings Inc. Agrees to Pay $17.4 Million to
Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
zimmer-biomet-holdings-inc-agrees-pay-174-million-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act
[https://perma.cc/9UEG-CMCC]. Biomet now operates as Zimmer Biomet Holdings Inc. See
David Gelles & William Alden, Zimmer Holdings to Buy Biomet for $13.35 Billion, N.Y. Times
(Apr. 24, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/zimmer-to-buy-biomet-for-13-35billion/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
200. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 11, United States v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings,
Inc., No. 12-CR-00080 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2017).
201. Id.
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could then adopt “a particular sequence of steps (a process)”202 targeted at
mitigating the problematic situations.
An example of a process-based intervention that might assist in
tracking unlawful behavior within a ﬁrm might be standardizing certain
elements of internal investigations. In the medical space, there are many
areas in which checklists must be followed. These checklists have been
helpful in (i) reducing unnecessary errors in care and (ii) reducing bias.203
Firms with large compliance risks might employ a similar approach to
ensure that all internal investigations answer a limited but consistent set of
questions. This would ensure that the ﬁrm got standardized information
across different departments and risk areas, but would still allow for those
charged with internal investigations to maintain their autonomy and
judgment over the investigation as a whole. Once a ﬁrm has standardized
data across internal investigations, it can then utilize that information to
spot trends like similar unlawful behavior within its ranks.204
2. Engage in Consistent Compliance Assessments. — When a ﬁrm
identiﬁes potential misconduct, it often triggers a particular response in
an effort to assess the scope and extent of the potential misconduct and,
if necessary, to develop a remediation strategy. The ﬁrm’s response to
potential or actual misconduct may, however, look quite different across
the organization’s departments or corporate entities. But when a
particular sequences of steps, a process, is adopted in response to a ﬁrm’s
compliance needs and goals, it may be “better situated to improve its
efficacy and thereby overall ﬁrm performance.”205
Many of the most signiﬁcant compliance failures in recent memory
were impacted, at least in part, by a failure of a ﬁrm to engage in robust
and effective investigative methods.206 And yet this is a relatively routine
task that many ﬁrms engage in once they detect a compliance failure.207
Complex organizations could choose to develop formal, prospective
processes in an effort to ensure that members throughout their
202. Sharpe, supra note 34, at 297.
203. See Mark L. Graber, Asta V. Sorensen, Jon Biswas, Varsha Modi, Andrew Wackett, Scott
Johnson, Nancy Lenfestey, Ashley N.D. Meyer & Hardeep Singh, Developing Checklists to
Prevent Diagnostic Error in Emergency Room Settings, 1 Diagnosis 223, 230 (2014) (“[T]he
success of checklists to improve surgical safety . . . seems adequately established . . . .”); Jessica
Nordell, A Fix for Gender Bias in Health Care? Check, N.Y. Times (Jan. 11, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/opinion/a-fix-for-gender-bias-in-health-care-check.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining how checklists reduce gender disparities in
treatment).
204. For instance, some ﬁrms ﬁnd that compliance is “a great opportunity to automate”
because the law is fairly straightforward and linear. Treliant Talks, supra note 130. As a
result, the company can look for “anomalies in the data,” which some have found to be a
more effective way to tackle compliance issues than simple sample testing. Id.
205. Sharpe, supra note 34, at 297.
206. See Root, Compliance Process, supra note 33, at 205–09, 224–25, 238–42 (detailing
investigative failures at Fox News, Wells Fargo, and Baylor University).
207. See id. at 224 (describing a standard investigatory phase for ﬁrms).
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organizations engage in similar investigative methods when misconduct is
detected. In doing so, a ﬁrm may better assess the nature and scope of
compliance failures, as well as have more standardized methods of
comparing compliance failures across diffuse departments and corporate
entities.
For instance, a number of departments and divisions within Wells Fargo
were aware of the need to investigate the firm’s sales practices since at least
2002. Members of the Legal Department, in particular the Employment
Section lawyers, “encountered sales misconduct and the termination of
several employees at one time . . . dating back at least to 2002.”208 Also in 2002,
“Internal Investigations determined that almost an entire branch in Colorado
engaged in a form of ‘gaming,’” a sales practice violation.209 The Community
Bank’s human resources department established a task force in 2002 “to
address the increasing focus on sales integrity issues in regional banking.”210
Finally, the Board of Directors’ Audit & Examination Committee received
materials referencing “sales conduct or ‘gaming’ issues” since at least 2002.211
The Committee, however, failed to identify that the issue in front of them was
significant.
Firms could employ a process-based reform when potentially
signiﬁcant information regarding misconduct arises, but there are questions about the breadth and scope of wrongdoing. For example, ﬁrms
could employ materiality surveys.212 Currently, many firms employ cultural
assessment surveys to “understand program effectiveness, build a business
case for resources or organizational changes, and develop reports for the
C-Suite or Board.”213 Firms that are interested in creating consistent
compliance assessments, however, might instead utilize a survey meant to
ascertain the materiality of certain types of misconduct within the organization. Firms could disseminate a materiality survey when an issue arises
that looks like it might become a material compliance failure in an effort
to determine the current scope and severity of the concern. For example,
the Wells Fargo Board was aware of sales practice violations, but discounted their importance based on how often they perceived the
violations were occurring. They failed to consider that only some of the
208. Wells Fargo Investigation Report, supra note 6, at 73.
209. Id. “Gaming” is a type of sales practice violation “deﬁned as the manipulation
and/or misrepresentation of sales to receive compensation or meet sales goals.” Id. at 31.
210. Id. at 80.
211. Id. at 98.
212. See KPMG Int’l, Sustainable Insight: The Essentials of Materiality Assessment 4 (2014),
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2014/10/materiality-assessment.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6KNP-5VTV] (“Materiality assessment is the process of identifying, refining, and
assessing numerous potential environmental, social and governance issues that could affect your
business, and/or your stakeholders, and condensing them into a short-list of topics that inform
company strategy, targets, and reporting.”).
213. Ethical Culture and Perceptions Assessment, Ethisphere, https://ethisphere.com/
what-we-do/culture-assessment/ [https://perma.cc/W688-P7LF] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).

288

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:249

violations were making it to the board. If, however, they had surveyed their
workforce, they may have found that the problem was more widespread than
they thought or that the Community Bank was struggling heavily in this area.
3. Aggregate Potential Compliance Concerns. — Not all reports of
misconduct or potential culpability result in a determination that wrongdoing has occurred. Those tasked with overseeing compliance efforts at
complex organizations will be presented with pieces of information that are
eventually deemed innocuous or considered an isolated incident. But
sometimes a seemingly innocuous or isolated event is actually an indication of a larger problem within the ﬁrm, and if complex ﬁrms with
diffuse departments and corporate entities have not employed a process
for tracking this information, devastating results may occur.
For example, in 2017, Larry Nassar, a former Michigan State
University doctor, pled guilty to “seven counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct involving more than 160 girls and women across more than two
decades.”214 Based on statements from several alleged victims of Nassar,
“[M]ore than a dozen Michigan State official[s] were notified through the
years of Nassar’s abuse.”215 Allegations vary on when Michigan State received its ﬁrst complaints about Nassar, with some citing 1992216 and others
1997.217 Regardless of the date, multiple complaints were made and explained
away as misunderstandings for approximately two decades.218 Michigan State
employees were aware of Nassar’s abuse, and their failure to respond
effectively to the complaints led to dozens of additional victims. Michigan
State had a compliance program in place to address concerns of this
nature via its Title IX program, but a 2014 investigation “found no
evidence of misconduct.”219 It does not appear, however, that prior reports
made their way to the Title IX office. If the seemingly isolated complaints
had been aggregated and tracked—whether within the Title IX office or
the human resources department—it may have helped to identify Nassar’s
misconduct at an earlier stage.

214. Vic Ryckaert, Larry Nassar Case: What You Need to Know About the Abuser of
More than 150 Young Athletes and the Fallout, Indianapolis Star (Jan. 25, 2018), https://
www.indystar.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/01/25/larry-nassar-usa-gymnastics-sex-abusewhat-we-know/1066355001/ [https://perma.cc/P894-C9LD].
215. Id.
216. Caroline Kitchener & Alia Wong, The Moral Catastrophe at Michigan State, Atlantic
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/09/the-moralcatastrophe-at-michigan-state/569776/ [https://perma.cc/795A-AHWQ].
217. Ryckaert, supra note 214.
218. See id; see also Rachael Denhollander, Rachael Denhollander: The Price I Paid for
Taking on Larry Nassar, N.Y. Times (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/
opinion/sunday/larry-nassar-rachael-denhollander.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(“In many ways, the sexual assault scandal that was 30 years in the making was only a symptom of
a much deeper cultural problem—the unwillingness to speak the truth against one’s own
community.”).
219. Kitchener & Wong, supra note 216.
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Complex organizations could adopt processes targeted at aggregating
certain pieces of information—like complaints about an employee’s
conduct—so that they were actively reviewed together instead of in isolation.
If firms were required to log complaints somewhere, particularly somewhere
beyond the employee’s direct reporting line or supervisor—and then later
reviewed for trends or significant concerns—it might help to bring potential
compliance failures to the forefront at an earlier stage. For example,
General Motors and Wells Fargo could have aggregated information they
had access to in a way to help them detect misconduct earlier, which would
have minimized the scope and severity of their compliance failures.
Importantly, aggregation of this type of information is a more reasonable
task for ﬁrms now, as tools related to data analytics become increasingly
more sophisticated.
a. Aggregate Liabilities. — General Motors settled several claims
regarding the nondeployment of airbags that were later found to have
been caused by a faulty ignition switch.220 General Motors’s product
litigation staff attorneys were permitted, on their own authority, to settle
claims up to $100,000.221 “Settlements of between $100,000 and $1.5
million (a limit which was eventually increased to $2 million) required
approval at a committee known as the ‘Roundtable,’” while “[s]ettlement
offers between $2 and $5 million required approval of a group called the
Settlement Review Committee[,] . . . [which] was chaired by the head of
global litigation.”222 Any settlements over $5 million required approval by
the General Counsel.223
Importantly, the processes General Motors had in place, however, did
not explicitly require the lawyers who formed part of the Roundtable to
“spot trends” indicating potential safety issues.224 When interviewed after
the fact, some lawyers believed they were supposed to spot trends, while
others stated that “it was not the Roundtable’s function to spot trends and
that if a lawyer had to ﬂag a trend, then the system had already failed.”225
And those investigating General Motors after the scandal came to light
“discovered no formal written policies governing how settlement committees should handle safety issues.”226
For an organization as large and diffuse as General Motors, whose
primary function is to manufacture automobiles, it might have been beneﬁcial to have instituted formal processes and guidance regarding how to
elevate information about potential safety concerns. Indeed, it might have
adopted an aggregation principle for the Roundtable. For instance, General
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Valukas, supra note 12, at 102–15.
Id. at 106–07.
Id. at 107.
Id.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id.
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Motors could have required the Roundtable to group all settlements for
the preceding one, three, and five years into similar categories. If a particular
category exceeded the $5 million threshold for reporting to the General
Counsel, the Roundtable could have investigated why the liabilities had gotten
to such a significant amount and determined whether they should further
refine the categories. Upon engaging in this process, the Roundtable could
have then provided a report to the General Counsel about the categories
they identiﬁed, how it came to be that a category exceeded the $5 million
cap, and whether that suggested the need for further categorization or a
potential settlement trend in need of further inquiry.
Instead, the Roundtable was left with murky guidance about what its
responsibilities were to track trends over time and no processes by which
to engage in that effort. Additionally, by structuring settlements within
certain amounts and only triggering General Counsel review beyond a
particular cap, General Motors’s own structural decisions ensured that the
General Counsel was unlikely to have the information necessary to identify
important trends on its own. When senior management at General Motors
failed to adopt a process or sequence of steps for elevating product safety
concerns or aggregating settlement information in a manner that might
trigger a safety review, it limited its ability to understand and respond to
issues that could form the basis of ﬁrm culpability.227 And yet, by
employing a relatively simple process tweak—aggregation—it could more
effectively assess the company’s liability and potential compliance failures.
b. Aggregate Whistleblower Reports. — Several former Wells Fargo
employees have alleged that they were dismissed from the company after
reporting wrongdoing to the bank’s internal ethics hotline regarding the
opening of fraudulent accounts.228 Additional employees have asserted allegations that “‘they were terminated for raising concerns’ about the improper
mortgage rate fees.”229 And another claimed he had been retaliated against
“for raising concerns regarding automobile lending practices.”230 In each of
these instances, the allegations from internal whistleblowers, if true,231 would
suggest that the structures Wells Fargo had in place—structures that would
fall within a compliance program’s attempts to detect misconduct as part of
its policing effort—failed.
And yet, if Wells Fargo employed an aggregation principle, the misconduct might have been easier for higher-ups within the organization to
227. Sharpe explains that “[w]hen a board adopts a particular sequence of steps (a process)
in response to the firm’s endogenously determined needs and goals, it is better situated to
improve its efficacy and thereby overall firm performance.” Sharpe, supra note 34, at 297.
228. Egan, supra note 6.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. The report assessing the sales practices at Wells Fargo does not provide a robust account
or assessment of these whistleblowers’ claims. Instead, footnote twenty-six of the report details
the steps the bank has taken to investigate the claims. Wells Fargo Investigation Report, supra
note 6, at 87 n.26.
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detect, investigate, and prevent from continuing. For example, assuming
it is true that several employees reported improper conduct to the bank’s
internal ethics hotline, it would appear that these reports were discounted
and discarded. One can imagine a world in which complaints made to an
ethics hotline are investigated on an individual basis, found to be without
merit, and discarded without any malicious intent.
Complaints to an ethics hotline or a human resources department
are, however, a perfect opportunity to employ an aggregation principle.
Each complaint could be categorized and logged, which would allow ﬁrms
to aggregate like claims together. At the end of a predetermined reporting
period, someone outside of the actual ethics hotline department, perhaps
even individuals at the board of directors level, could review the aggregated data trends. It may be that each individual complaint regarding the
opening of fraudulent accounts, when investigated, would appear innocuous once the ﬁrm interviewed the employees. But in the aggregate, if one
sees many complaints for a particular person, group, or topic, it might
trigger a more fulsome review into the issues, which could assist the firm in
identifying, responding to, and ultimately preventing future compliance
failures.
The type of information a ﬁrm should aggregate would depend upon
the ﬁrm’s business and corresponding risks. But in each of the above
examples, the organizations were already employing tactics to help them
identify potential compliance concerns, but they did so without creating
process-related reforms that may have made it easier for the organizations
to aggregate information. As technology continues to improve, the ability
of ﬁrms to track information in an effort to spot trends will increase.232 By
aggregating information, complex organizations will be better equipped
to prevent, detect, investigate, and remediate compliance failures within
their ranks.
*

*

*

Each of these three suggestions demonstrates how complex
organizations might better create effective global compliance programs by
adopting process-related reforms to complement their existing organizational structure and composition. If done properly, the implementation
of more formalized processes may not only make certain compliance issues
more accessible, but also increase the feasibility of detecting and addressing
potential compliance failures in a proactive, prompt, and effective manner.

232. Relatedly, this also increases regulators’ expectations of what risks corporations can
and should be able to prevent. See Deloitte, Compliance Modernization supra note 149, at
4 (“[I]n many industries [regulators] have more powerful analytical tools and practices to
measure and identify compliance-related risks as well as bad behaviors and practices.”).
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Limitations to Process

Process, while important, cannot function on its own. As explained
in section I.B, it is necessarily tied to an organization’s decisions related
to its structure and composition. In particular, process-related reforms
will be unlikely to work if the firm (i) lacks certain structural components
or (ii) suffers from a corrupt culture. Two recent scandals demonstrate
these limitations.
1. Lacking Structural Components. — In July 2018, a Pennsylvania
grand jury issued a report related to an investigation into the sexual abuse
of children within the Catholic Church.233 The report is over 800 pages
long and includes a great deal of information. One takeaway from the
report, however, is the lack of strong governance structures that may have
prompted more fulsome reviews of misconduct. In particular, complaints
were purposively and deliberately kept secret:
While each church district had its idiosyncrasies, the pattern was
pretty much the same. The main thing was not to help children,
but to avoid “scandal.” That is not our word, but theirs; it appears
over and over again in the documents we recovered. Abuse
complaints were kept locked up in a “secret archive.” That is not
our word, but theirs; the [C]hurch’s Code of Canon Law specifically requires the diocese to maintain such an archive. Only the
bishop can have the key.234
Additionally, a number of practices were employed to “conceal[] the
truth.”235 For example, “[M]ake sure to use euphemisms rather than real
words to describe the sexual assaults . . . . Never say ‘rape’; say ‘inappropriate
contact’ or ‘boundary issues.’”236 Additionally, “[D]on’t conduct genuine
investigations with properly trained personnel. Instead, assign fellow
clergy members to ask inadequate questions and then make credibility
determinations about the colleagues with whom they live and work.”237
The grand jury report goes on from there, but it suggests that the Catholic
Church employed signiﬁcantly deﬁcient governance practices, which
contributed to the continued, widespread, and in many instances, repeated
misconduct within its ranks.
For an organization without strong structural components, processrelated reforms will be limited in effectiveness, because there is nowhere

233. Office of the Att’y Gen., Commonwealth of Pa., Report I of the 40th Statewide
Investigating Grand Jury (2018), https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/
08/A-Report-of-the-Fortieth-Statewide-Investigating-Grand-Jury_Cleland-Redactions-8-12-08_
Redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM6D-YPBY].
234. Id. at 2.
235. Id. at 3.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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for the process to go.238 For example, even if one were to have aggregated
complaints, those aggregations would have ended up in a secret archive.
An organization must have the governance framework provided by strong
structure in order for process reforms to thrive.
2. Corrupt Cultures. — Process-related reforms are also unlikely to
work within organizations with corrupt cultures. “Culture becomes
especially important, then, when—as is often the case—the structural
aspects of compliance and supervision cannot or do not otherwise influence
behavior.”239 Because process-related reforms are meant to augment
structure and to ﬁll gaps structure cannot reach, they are particularly
susceptible to stagnation as a result of a corrupt culture.
For example, in February 2017, an employee detailed experiences of
sexual harassment and ineffective reporting to human resources at Uber.
In particular, her manager allegedly propositioned her to have sex over
company chat.240 When she took screenshots and sent them to human
resources, she was allegedly told “by both HR and upper management that
even though this was clearly sexual harassment . . . it was this man’s ﬁrst
offense, and that they wouldn’t feel comfortable giving him anything other
than a warning and a stern talking to.”241 She was then allegedly given the
choice of (i) ﬁnding another team or (ii) remaining on her team with the
knowledge that she would likely receive a poor performance review.242 A
human resources representative also allegedly told her that the company
would not consider a poor performance review retaliation because she had
been given the option of joining another team.243 Once she left the team,
however, she learned that other women had reported the manager to
human resources and that “both HR and management had been lying
about this being ‘his ﬁrst offense.’”244
The employee subsequently published a blog post regarding her
experiences, which resulted in a resolution by Uber’s Board of Directors
to establish a Special Committee of the Board to oversee an investigation
into Uber’s workplace environment and their policies and practices
238. One scholar has noted that “the laity was reporting the abuse to the Church but
the hierarchy buried those reports in secret ﬁles.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, Restoring
Conﬁdence in the Roman Catholic Church: Corporate Governance Analogies 8 (UCLA Sch.
of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 18-32, 2018), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3249236 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
239. Langevoort, supra note 75, at 944 (“An ideal culture of compliance would be one
that accepts public responsibility to lessen the net social costs of its activities—the harms
from legal wrongdoing—even if a private calculus of likely consequences suggests that there
is money to be made by cautious cheating.”).
240. Susan J. Fowler, Reﬂecting on One Very, Very Strange Year at Uber, Susan J. Fowler
Blog (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.susanjfowler.com/blog/2017/2/19/reflecting-on-onevery-strange-year-at-uber [https://perma.cc/9KXY-6T8P].
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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related to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.245 The employee’s
allegations suggested a potentially defunct corporate culture at Uber that
prioritized “high-performing” managers over establishing a positive
workplace culture that acted according to industry standards regarding
sexual harassment and discrimination complaints.246 Eric Holder and
Tammy Albarrán oversaw the investigation into Uber, and their recommendations speciﬁcally referenced culture at Uber on several occasions. In
particular, they recommended that Uber utilize its search for a new Chief
Operating Officer to find candidates with “experience in improving
institutional culture.”247 Additionally, they recommended that the Board of
Directors “create an Ethics and Culture Committee or a similar body” to
assist Uber’s “efforts and enhance a culture of ethical business practices,
diversity, and inclusion within the organization.”248
In the case of Uber, it appears that human resources and high-level
management were aware of the allegedly multiple complaints against the
employee’s manager. Because, however, the culture did not appropriately
value claims of sexual harassment and discrimination, it took no action. A
materiality survey or aggregation principle, given the cultural realities at
the ﬁrm, would not have changed the ﬁrm’s response to employee
complaints.
*

*

*

This Article argues that complex organizations should prioritize
robust process-related compliance reforms that can act as a safety net when
traditional monitoring structures fail to detect or appropriately respond
to compliance failures because of the existence of information silos within
the ﬁrm. Because ﬁrms have increased in complexity over time, they often
suffer from information silos and these silos exist in both centralized and
decentralized management structures. Compliance strategies rooted in
structure and composition are limited in their ability to combat information silos, and therefore limited in their ability to properly detect,
investigate, and ultimately prevent certain compliance failures from
becoming widespread and signiﬁcant. As demonstrated above, however,
ﬁrms can employ a variety of process-related reforms to improve their
compliance efforts. These process-related actions, practices, and routines
employed by ﬁrms to communicate information necessary to prevent,
detect, investigate, and remediate compliance failures will necessarily vary,
because they will need to be tailored to speciﬁc ﬁrms’ businesses and risk
proﬁles in order to be effective. As the General Motors and Wells Fargo
245. The Holder Report on Uber’s Workplace Culture 1 (2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2017/06/13/technology/document-The-Holder-Report-on-Uber.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
246. See Fowler, supra note 240.
247. The Holder Report on Uber’s Workplace Culture, supra note 245, at 2.
248. Id.
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examples demonstrated, process reforms have the potential to greatly
improve compliance efforts within organizations. The promise of process
is, however, limited. To be effective it requires a ﬁrm to (i) have a strong
organizational structure and (ii) be free from a corrupt culture.
IV. POTENTIAL BENEFITS & REMAINING QUESTIONS
As explained above, if complex organizations were to adopt more robust
and formal processes, they would be better able to tackle the challenge of
implementing complex compliance strategies that are equipped to combat
compliance failures within organizations with diffuse departments and corporate entities. This Part discusses some of the potential benefits to the Article’s
argument. It concludes with a discussion of some remaining questions.
A.

Potential Beneﬁts

This Article argues that complex organizations would beneﬁt from a
compliance strategy focused on creating a set of standards that includes
the adoption of formalized processes that can be applied across the ﬁrm.
This section brieﬂy discusses ﬁve beneﬁts to this Article’s proposal, but
there are others.
1. Tailored to Individual Firms. — Legal and regulatory interventions,
and sometimes even industry standards, often require ﬁrms to adopt
particular programs and policies. These mandated elements of a ﬁrm’s
compliance program tend to focus on policing and structural components
because those are relatively easy to impose on a ﬁrm. A limitation of
mandated compliance reforms, however, is that they are not tailored to
the speciﬁc ﬁrm and its organizational structure.
Each complex organization is unique. Walmart’s web of subsidiaries,
related entities, and departments will be distinct from that found at
General Motors or Wells Fargo. As such, ﬁrms must tailor at least some
elements of their compliance programs to their own individual business
structures and anticipated risks. Thus, a primary beneﬁt of the approach
outlined in this Article is that individual ﬁrms can tailor it to their needs.
Even if multiple ﬁrms decide to adopt processes related to how they
will conduct investigations, their implementation of those processes and
the details of their plans will be different as a result of their varied
corporate structures. Because of this, it is unrealistic to provide detailed
suggestions regarding how a process for investigation should be implemented at all ﬁrms, because each ﬁrm will need to develop their own. But
the ability to adapt and tailor the suggestions provided in this Article
enables ﬁrms to take its high-level insights and craft individualized compliance programs likely to achieve the desired result of ensuring compliant
behavior throughout their organizations.
2. Respond Prior to Governmental Intervention. — This Article’s
suggestion that ﬁrms adopt formal processes in an effort to develop more
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complex compliance programs will support the self-policing function
ﬁrms are expected to engage in. Indeed, process-related reforms may
strengthen many ﬁrms’ prospective efforts to prevent misconduct within
their ranks and assist ﬁrms to develop strategies that will allow them to
respond more quickly to potentially problematic behavior.
For example, if a ﬁrm has processes in place regarding how it should
evaluate and aggregate certain types of information, it may identify trends
and risks more quickly. Because the government will almost always receive
information after a company is aware of it, developing strong processes
may allow companies to respond to misconduct prior to the implementation
of a formal investigation by the government. And when firms proactively
respond to misconduct, adjust their compliance programs accordingly, and
report their actions to the government voluntarily, they are often sanctioned
less harshly than if the conduct was not discovered until prompted by a
formal governmental investigation.249 As such, complex corporations may
not only improve their compliance programs by adopting formal processes
across diffuse departments and entities, they may also reduce their
potential liability from government enforcement agents when misconduct
does occur.250
3. Applicable Across Different Types of Complex Organizations. — This
Article’s proposal is equally applicable to both multinational corporations
with a variety of subsidiaries and a single organization with many diffuse
departments within one organizational structure. The silos found within
and between departments in a large enough organization can sometimes
mimic what is found when an organization is divided up into different
parent companies and subsidiaries. The goal of this Article’s proposal is to
ﬁnd processes that individuals throughout the ﬁrm can utilize, even when
the ﬁrm is made up of many departments that largely work on their own
with minimal contact from members of the organization’s different
departments.
For example, universities are large organizations that are made up of
several freestanding departments that operate on their own much of the
time. The athletic department may have limited contact with individuals
from the admissions department and the department of architecture. And
each of these departments may have different organizational structures and
methods of interacting with students. Yet each department might benefit
from standardized processes related to how individuals are expected to
handle confidential student information or respond to claims of sexual
harassment. By utilizing consistent processes throughout the university, it will
249. See, e.g., Alexandra Clark & Shawn Wright, Significant M&A Development: DOJ
Urges U.S. Companies Acquiring or Merging with Foreign Companies to Self-Disclose
FCPA Misconduct Identified During Due Diligence, BlankRome (Aug. 2018), https://
www.blankrome.com/publications/significant-ma-development-doj-urges-us-companiesacquiring-or-merging-foreign [https://perma.cc/T677-V5KW].
250. Root, Compliance Process, supra note 33, at 216–18 (explaining why organizations are
not held to the standard of ensuring “perfect compliance” within their ranks).
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be better equipped to assess and evaluate certain areas of risk and concern
at a high level.
Importantly, the processes advocated for in this Article are exportable
to a variety of areas. A ﬁrm may be able to develop processes for
responding to claims of sexual harassment even when applied to twenty
different departments with varied methods of reporting lines and assessments. A ﬁrm may be able to develop processes for investigating claims by
internal whistleblowers in response to varied compliance areas like antibribery, corruption, human rights, and environmental laws and regulations. A focus on process can bring an element of standardization to the
sometimes unwieldy task of ensuring compliance throughout a complex
organization.
4. Concurrent Responses to Global Regulatory Concerns. — One of the
biggest challenges for complex organizations is centered on the sheer
scope of the legal and regulatory requirements they must track and comply
with.251 By focusing on developing formalized processes for certain matters,
firms can respond to multiple, related regulatory requirements through the
lens of one consistent strategy.
For example, within the anti-bribery space, there are numerous laws
that multinational corporations are required to comply with. In 2017, it
was noted that “[s]everal countries have introduced or propose[d] to
introduce new anti-bribery and corruption laws,” including France, India,
South Korea, Ireland, Mexico, China, Vietnam, Germany, Slovakia,
Colombia, Jordan, and Kenya.252 This is in addition to robust enforcement
regimes within the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and
many other jurisdictions.253 There are distinctions within these laws that will
sometimes require jurisdiction-specific adjustments to a firm’s compliance
program, but in general a ﬁrm will be able to create high-level processes
targeted at deterring bribery throughout its organization in a manner that
is responsive to the general concern of these sorts of prohibitions.
And other legal areas, like anti-bribery, have reached similar points of
consensus throughout the world. Whether it is a concern regarding anti251. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory
Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 Geo. L.J. 757, 758–65 (2003) (analyzing and identifying
“regulatory accretion,” which is the growth in both size and scope of applicable regulations); see
also Edward Hida, Global Risk Management Survey, 10th Edition, Deloitte: Insights (Mar. 2,
2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/topics/risk-management/global-riskmanagement-survey.html [https://perma.cc/DZ76-PH42] (noting that in a survey of financial
institutions around the globe, “[M]ost institutions reported that regulatory reform in majority
jurisdictions where they operate has resulted in important strategic impacts” and that “[t]he cost
of compliance has been increasing across the industry”).
252. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Anti-Bribery and Corruption: Global Enforcement
and Legislative Developments 2017, at 1, 9 (2017), https://www.freshﬁelds.com/globalassets/
services-page/global-investigations/publication-pdfs/gi-abc-guide-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E9ZS-TT8y].
253. See, e.g., id. at 22–23, 31–32, 40–46 (describing the enforcement regimes of countries
around the world, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany).
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bribery, antitrust, or human rights, complex organizations would beneﬁt
from developing formal processes to deal with risks that are of concern to
multiple jurisdictions where they do business. It will streamline the ﬁrm’s
compliance efforts, make it easier to assess the success of the firm’s program,
and improve the firm’s efforts to comply with the global norm at issue.
5. Overcoming Personal Biases. — One beneﬁt of a compliance
program that includes robust process-related reforms, like an aggregation
principle, is that it requires a potential response regardless of the views
that the person charged with investigating the potential compliance failure
has about the alleged activity. For example, employees within General
Motors may have believed they were building safe cars. Individuals at
Michigan State may have believed Larry Nassar was an excellent and talented
sports doctor. People within Wells Fargo may have believed their sales
goals were unlikely to cause harm to consumers. These beliefs were wrong,
but when individuals start off from these particular places, they may look
for evidence that conﬁrms their preexisting understandings of the world.
There are a variety of internal biases that may impact workplace
investigations, but practitioners have identiﬁed “two broad types” of
particular interest.254 The ﬁrst includes biases “toward social groups,” like
a bias toward men in management versus women at lower employment
levels as was potentially seen in the Uber example.255 The second includes
biases “that lead to ‘tunnel vision,’ including conﬁrmation bias, lie bias,
and trustworthiness bias.”256 Confirmation bias refers to “‘the tendency to
[unconsciously] bolster a hypothesis,’ belief, or expectation by seeking
and/or favoring conﬁrming information while minimizing or ignoring
disconﬁrming information.”257 Biases of this type can interfere with the
detection and investigation of compliance failures. By adopting certain
processes that all employees must follow in response to certain events,
ﬁrms can help their employees to overcome certain biases and engage in
a more robust assessment of the situation.

254. Ashley Lattal, The Hidden World of Unconscious Bias and Its Impact on the
“Neutral” Workplace Investigator, 24 J.L. & Pol’y 411, 425–26 (2016).
255. Id. at 425–33.
256. Id. at 426. Lie bias refers to “a bias towards believing a person to be deceptive rather
than truthful.” Id. at 439. Trustworthiness bias “suggests that instantaneous impressions of
trustworthiness based on facial appearance may play a major role in both assessing the
credibility of and ensuing decisions about the target.” Id. at 441 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Stephen Portera, Leanne ten Brinkea & Chantal Gustaw, Dangerous
Decisions: The Impact of First Impressions of Trustworthiness on the Evaluation of Legal
Evidence and Defendant Culpability, 16 Psychol., Crime & L. 477, 478 (2010)) (misquotation).
257. Id. at 435 (alteration in original) (quoting Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An
Examination of Factors that Aggravate and Counteract Conﬁrmation Bias in Criminal
Investigations, 15 Psychol., Pub. Pol’y & L. 315, 315 (2009)).
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Remaining Questions

Notwithstanding the beneﬁts described above, there remain some
additional questions raised by this Article’s suggestions and argument.
This section brieﬂy discusses several such questions.
1. Does this Article’s Proposal Fail to Consider the Impact of Paper or
Cosmetic Compliance? — Part III notes two limitations to the Article’s
suggestion for ﬁrms to pursue process-based compliance reforms: if the
ﬁrm (i) lacks certain structural components or (ii) suffers from a corrupt
culture. Some might, however, raise a third concern related to the imposition of “paper” or “cosmetic” compliance programs. There exist concerns
“that internal compliance structures do not deter prohibited conduct within
firms and may largely serve a window-dressing function that provides both
market legitimacy and reduced legal liability.”258
If too much emphasis is placed on internal compliance structures, it
“raises potential dangers of underenforcement and social waste.”259
Indeed, one often hears government enforcement agents express concern
about “paper” compliance programs.260 If a ﬁrm is engaged in cosmetic or
paper compliance efforts, they might attempt to adopt what looks like a
process-based reform to help demonstrate that they have an effective
compliance program when in fact they are not engaged in activities likely to
be effective. Process-based reforms, which will be firm-specific and would
likely require firms to enter into on their own initiative, may be just as, if not
more, difficult for the public to evaluate and oversee. Additionally, because
there is a dearth of information on the costs and benefits of compliance
programs even within firms,261 it may even be difficult for a firm to assess the
effectiveness of a process-based reform.
The concerns expressed by Professor Kimberly Krawiec and others are
important and necessary to keep at the forefront of all efforts meant to
improve ethics and compliance programs within ﬁrms. The foundation of
this Article is, in many ways, built on these insights. This Article recognizes
that despite a signiﬁcant commitment of time and resources by both ﬁrms
and the government, compliance programs continue to fail. As ﬁrms have
become more complex, information silos have increased in severity and
import. As demonstrated above, the current focus of compliance reforms
258. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance,
81 Wash. U. L.Q. 487, 491 (2003).
259. Id.
260. See John J. Carney, George A. Stamboulidis, Andres A. Muñoz & Patrick T. Campbell,
Pulling Back the Curtain: DOJ to Take Action Against Window Dressing Corporate Compliance
Programs, BakerHostetler (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/pulling-back-thecurtain-doj-to-take-action-against-window-dressing-corporate-compliance-programs [https://
perma.cc/DXZ4-RPRE] (describing how the DOJ was in the process of hiring a “full-time expert
in compliance programs . . . tasked with investigating corporate compliance programs to
determine whether they are effective or mere window dressing”).
261. See Hui Chen & Eugene Soltes, Why Compliance Programs Fail—And How to Fix
Them, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.–Apr. 2018, at 116, 120, 122–23.
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via structure and composition will not, on their own, effectively combat
these information silos. With that knowledge, it is imperative that ﬁrms
attempt to ﬁnd strategies they can adopt to combat information silos and
improve compliance efforts. This Article contributes to that effort by
relying on scholarship from management and organizational behavior to
argue that current compliance efforts might beneﬁt from adopting some
process-based reforms as part of their compliance strategy. And while it is
true scholars cannot empirically test this Article’s thesis at this time, there
will be no mechanism for this testing without experimentation from ﬁrms
consistent with this Article’s proposals.
2. What About Efforts Already Advocated for Within the Compliance
Industry? — The idea that compliance should do more than policing is
widely accepted within the industry, and each scholars’ deﬁnition of
compliance outlined in Part I puts forth the notion that compliance
programs within ﬁrms must focus on more than complying with formal
legal and regulatory requirements.262 Currently, there is general consensus
within the compliance industry about certain components that should be
included within an organization’s compliance program. For example, a
high-quality compliance program is often described as emphasizing (i)
tone at the top, (ii) corporate culture, (iii) risk assessments, (iv) testing
and monitoring, and (v) empowerment of a chief compliance officer.263
Thus, one critique of this Article’s proposals may be that organizations are
already implementing a variety of strategies beyond mere policing that
include elements of structure, composition, and process.
As noted above, however, there may be particular challenges facing
complex organizations that will make these various components difficult
to implement or less effective than in smaller organizations. For instance,
the importance of establishing a strong tone at the top has been
emphasized within the compliance industry for years. As explained by
Deloitte:
The starting point for any world-class ethics and compliance program
is the board and senior management, and the sense of responsibility
they share to protect the shareholders’ reputational and ﬁnancial
assets. The board and senior management should do more than pay
“lip service” to ethics and compliance. They need to empower and
properly resource the individuals who have day-to-day responsibilities
to mitigate risks and build organizational trust.264
The top is, quite literally, the top and is commonly understood to include
the senior management and leadership for the organization.
262. See supra section I.C.
263. See, e.g., Deloitte, Building World-Class Ethics and Compliance Programs: Making a
Good Program Great—Five Ingredients for Your Program 3 (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/risk/us-aers-g2g-compendium.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2YFA-FM76] [hereinafter Deloitte, World-Class Programs].
264. Id.
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The top within complex organizations, however, is often removed
from most of the organization’s agents and employees. There is evidence
from behavioral ethics scholarship that the example set by ﬁrm leaders will
have a trickle-down effect throughout the ﬁrm,265 but for large,
multinational organizations the distances between the top and the
individuals on the ground expected to comply with legal and regulatory
requirements can be quite large. One of the challenges for complex organizations will be connecting the decisionmaking of the board and other top
management with the everyday activities of employees. Deloitte’s definition
acknowledges this and suggests that the board and top management must
provide proper resources for employees with “day-to-day responsibilities” for
mitigating risk within the organization.266 But there are a variety of
examples where top management within complex organizations have
attempted to provide resources that were ultimately ineffective.
For example, Wells Fargo, in an attempt to grow its company and,
presumably, add value to shareholders, initiated a program that included
“product sales goals for retail bankers.”267 This was likely a relatively
innocuous policy when adopted, but it resulted in its employees secretly
opening accounts on behalf of its customers, so that they could “meet sales
targets and receive bonuses.”268 Wells Fargo attempted to set a tone at the
top that was not inherently problematic, but it had devastating results and
spurred illegal conduct. And Wells Fargo’s attempt to provide resources to
lower level employees failed. As explained above, Wells Fargo set up an
ethics hotline in an effort to empower employees to report potential
misconduct.269 Numerous individuals, however, have come forward to
claim that after making a report via the ethics hotline, they were ﬁred.270
The board followed a common industry practice meant to help bridge the
gap between high-level officials within the ﬁrm and low-level employees
when it adopted an ethics hotline,271 but it did so in a manner that

265. See, e.g., Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance
Through Organizational Values and Culture, 25 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 961, 974–79 (2012).
266. See Deloitte, World-Class Programs, supra note 263, at 3.
267. Deon Roberts, Wells Fargo Unveils New Pay Plan for Branch Bankers in Wake of
Scandal, Charlotte Observer (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/
business/banking/bank-watch-blog/article125692619.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
268. Deon Roberts & Rick Rothacker, Wells Fargo Fined $185M for ‘Widespread Illegal
Practices’ that Hurt Customers, Charlotte Observer (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.charlotte
observer.com/news/business/banking/bank-watch-blog/article100499067.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
269. See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Whistle-Blower Wins $5.4 Million and His Job
Back, N.Y. Times (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/business/04-wellsfargo-whistleblower-ﬁred-osha.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., Allan Dinkoff, Corporate Compliance Programs After Dodd–Frank 14 (2011),
https://www.weil.com/~/media/ﬁles/pdfs/corporate_compliance_post_dodd-frank_aelc_
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ultimately was ineffective, because there were not adequate processes in
place to ensure conﬁdentiality and upward reporting of the information.
A fair response may be that Wells Fargo did not actually have a positive
tone at the top. Indeed, maybe Wells Fargo had implemented a plan meant
to pay lip service to ethics and compliance. The problem, however, is that
Wells Fargo’s plan appeared good enough that the federal government
failed to act when warned about potential misconduct years prior to the
ultimate discovery of misconduct at Wells Fargo.272 If government regulators
have difficulty understanding the depth and scope of corporate misconduct
when receiving a direct report, how much more difficult would it be for a
board member of a parent company with hundreds of subsidiaries worldwide? There is much that is good about establishing a strong tone at the
top, but unique challenges exist for a complex organization when attempting to utilize tone at the top as a primary component of its compliance
strategy.
Similarly, creating a consistent corporate culture273 within a complex
organization is a difficult endeavor. It may be relatively easy to say “[d]on’t
be evil,” a phrase attributable to Google’s former code of conduct,274 but
what constitutes “evil” may look quite different in Omaha, Nebraska than in
Venezuela. Attempting to create continuity within one, cohesive corporate
entity is very different than attempting to establish one across diffuse departments and countries. That is not to say it cannot be accomplished; it is to say
it may be particularly challenging for complex corporations. For these
more sophisticated organizations, it may be that more speciﬁcity is needed
when discussing the components of a high-level compliance program.
As a ﬁnal example, it is undisputed that organizations of all sizes must
engage in risk assessments. As noted by Deloitte:

oct.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4KF-BMRV] (“Many policies . . . limited . . . availability of the
anonymous, conﬁdential employee hotline and other internal complaint procedures to
accounting and auditing matters within the audit committee’s purview. Companies should . . .
broaden[] . . . policies to cover all illegal and inappropriate behavior . . . encouraging . . .
use . . . for any matter (particularly where employees are seeking anonymity and
confidentiality).”).
272. See Ann Marsh, Unprotected: How the Feds Failed Two Wells Fargo Whistleblowers,
Am. Banker (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/unprotected-how-thefeds-failed-two-wells-fargo-whistleblowers [https://perma.cc/KF38-ZTDW] (describing the
mishandling of two whistleblower cases where the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration failed to thoroughly investigate whistleblower claims and adequately protect
them from retaliation).
273. Deloitte, World-Class Programs, supra note 263, at 3 (“A culture of integrity is central
to any effective ethics and compliance program. Initiatives that do not clearly contribute to a
culture of ethical and compliant behavior may be viewed as perfunctory functions instilling
controls that are impediments to driving the ‘value change’ of the enterprise.”).
274. Justin Wm. Moyer, Alphabet, Now Google’s Overlord, Ditches ‘Don’t Be Evil’ for ‘Do
the Right Thing,’ Wash. Post (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2015/10/05/alphabet-now-googles-overlord-ditches-dont-be-evil-in-favor-of-do-theright-thing/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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Ethics and compliance risk assessments are not just about process—
they are also about understanding the risks that an organization
faces. The risk assessment focuses the board and senior management on those risks that are most significant within the organization,
and provides the basis for determining the actions necessary to
avoid, mitigate, or remediate those risks.275
There cannot be an effective compliance program without an assessment
of what sorts of activities one is going to focus upon.
Yet even in the area of risk assessment, large, international organizations are uniquely challenged due to the sheer breadth and scope of
their potential risk. When faced with legal and regulatory requirements,
as well as industry standards and practices across multiple jurisdictions, the
compliance department must make decisions about what areas they are
likely to focus on. General Motors was focused on FCPA compliance while
signiﬁcant risks were arising within the area of product safety.276 FCPA
violations are known for resulting in signiﬁcant monetary damages and
sanctions, sometimes from regulators worldwide, so today’s ﬁrms are quick
to develop strong anti-bribery and corruption programs. But for a company
like General Motors, even if product safety violations result in potential fines
that are substantially less than those found in the FCPA context, product
safety may actually be the largest area of risk, although perhaps not monetary
risk, for an automobile manufacturer.277 Thus, ensuring its product safety
compliance processes were effective arguably should have been at the top of
the priority list for its compliance department and its personnel worldwide.
In short, while the general understandings throughout the compliance
industry about the components necessary for a high-level compliance
program often make sense, incorporating them into complex organizations
can be associated with many unique limitations. As such, complex organizations must go beyond these generalized components and adopt formalized
processes targeted to improve their compliance programs by merging
policing and structural components into one complex compliance strategy.278
3. Will the Move to Global Compliance Programs Combat Information Silos? —
This Article notes that many firms are adopting global compliance
programs. As this process is ongoing, will firms be able to, over time, perfect
the structural components of their compliance programs in a manner that
will combat information silos?
275. Deloitte, World-Class Programs, supra note 263, at 3.
276. See Veronica Root Martinez, The Outsized Inﬂuence of the FCPA, 2019 Ill. L. Rev.
1205, 1214–16 [hereinafter Martinez, The Outsized Inﬂuence].
277. Id.
278. See Miriam H. Baer, Confronting the Two Faces of Corporate Fraud, 66 Fla. L. Rev.
87, 93–94 (2014) (explaining that the “policing approach reduces corporate crime by
empowering internal policemen to identify, punish, and deter actual and would-be
transgressors” and contrasting with an “architectural approach [that] encourages corporate
personnel to seek out and mitigate problematic situations as opposed to problematic
people”).
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For example, Goldman Sachs has a “Global Compliance division” that
is “dedicated to protecting the reputation of the ﬁrm and managing risk
across all business areas.”279 Their global compliance program “is organized
broadly into divisional compliance groups, which are embedded into the
areas they support, and centralized compliance groups, which survey risks
and manage regulatory affairs, services and resources related to all
businesses and employees of the ﬁrm globally.”280 Structures of this type
are meant to take on the beneﬁts of centralization and decentralization in
an effort to create effective compliance programs.
The problem, however, is that it would be misguided to think of
structure and process as happening in a vacuum.281 They are interconnected components necessary for the creation of an effective compliance
program. While this Article does recount the limits of structural reforms,
it does so in an effort to argue for the adoption of more robust processoriented reforms to augment structures and create truly complex compliance programs.
4. Are These Scandals Just Indicative of a Failure to Comply with the
Compliance Program? — As noted above, widespread and significant compliance failures have a variety of causes. Information silos contribute to their
existence, but there are others. One might wonder whether these scandals
are representative of failures by compliance programs or, instead, of a
failure of employees within the organization to adhere to the compliance
program. In each of these scandals, one can identify an employee or group
of employees whose actions were questionable and hindered the organization’s ability to stop the misconduct.
The reality, however, is that there are common understandings of
what is and is not an effective compliance program. Those measures may
be wrong, and legal scholars should continue to ask those questions, but
the understandings remain. And whether a firm has or does not have an
effective compliance program is assessed in an objective manner. If a firm is
found to have an effective compliance program, their potential sanctions
decrease dramatically.
For example, in 2018, following Nassar’s guilty plea, the NCAA
“cleared Michigan State of any rules violations” related to Nassar’s abuse,
suggesting it found no ﬂaw within the Michigan State compliance
program.282 Additionally, a November 2017 external review of Michigan
State’s “Policy on Relationship Violence and Sexual Misconduct” determined
279. Global Compliance, Goldman Sachs, http://www.goldmansachs.com/careers/
divisions/global-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/9QJA-EZDJ] (last visited Oct. 10, 2019).
280. Id.
281. Hernes, supra note 34, at 69.
282. Will Hobson, NCAA Clears Michigan State of Rules Violations in Larry Nassar Case,
Wash. Post (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2018/08/30/
ncaa-clears-michigan-state-of-rules-violations-in-larry-nassar-case/ (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
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that Michigan State’s “policies and procedures comply with current legal
requirements and agency guidance, and in several places, reﬂect leadingedge policy concepts that other institutions might consider replicating in
their own policies.”283 Thus, as demonstrated by Michigan State University’s
Title IX scandal, even something considered a “flawless” compliance program
is often an environment in which misconduct occurs over long periods of
time.284 Unfortunately, misconduct can occur even within the ambit of an
effective compliance program. As a result, it is crucial that compliance failures
are probed beyond the point of identification of rogue actors. Firms must
engage in a complete assessment of the cause or causes of the compliance
failure and the remediation efforts needed to address the full breadth of
the breakdown.
5. What if There Is Incomplete or Inaccurate Data? — For a process-based
reform like aggregation to work, a firm would need to have a system in place
for gathering relevant data. If either the data is poor (i.e., poorly classified
or filed) or if important information is missing (i.e., unreported) then an
aggregation principle will not add value to the ﬁrm’s compliance efforts.
Yet, for many of the most signiﬁcant recent compliance failures,
data—in many instances a great deal of data—did exist. This information
was identiﬁed after the misconduct had become widespread. The goal of
this Article’s proposals is to aid ﬁrms in catching potential misconduct at
an early stage, which was a possibility for General Motors, Wells Fargo,
Michigan State, Uber, and the Catholic Church. If the complaints had
been synthesized and assessed in a more systematic way, the outcomes at
each of these organizations could have looked quite different. The
knowledge that a ﬁrm may sometimes have incomplete data is not an
excuse for failing to act on the information of which it is in fact aware.
6. Are the Costs Associated with Increased Process Worth It? — One of the
burgeoning questions in the compliance literature is focused around the
need to develop measures for determining the effectiveness of compliance
programs.285 For scholars to assess and analyze the true costs associated
with compliance, more measurement of compliance efforts would need to
take place. The challenge is that anecdotal reports suggest that many ﬁrms
do not break out the costs of the different components of their compliance
programs in a meaningful way.286 Because data on the costs of speciﬁc
283. Husch Blackwell, Report 1 of 2: Review of Michigan State University’s Policy on
Relationship Violence and Sexual Misconduct 4 (2017), http://titleix.msu.edu/informationreports/msu_report_2017_external.pdf [https://perma.cc/SCX3-SECF].
284. See Hobson, supra note 282.
285. See, e.g., ComplianceNet Inaugural Conference: Measuring Compliance in the 21st
Century, ComplianceNet (June 1–2, 2018), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/20ab40_3c5b720
ef0574bc9ad97f0629b1ee264.pdf [https://perma.cc/CEJ5-3GWY] (showing a schedule for a
2018 conference dedicated to discussing various compliance measurements and enforcements).
286. See Chen & Soltes, supra note 261, at 119 (“At its core, the idea is as simple as it is
crucial: Firms cannot design effective compliance programs without effective measurement
tools.”).
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compliance efforts are extremely challenging to obtain at this time, it is
not possible to conduct a robust cost–beneﬁt analysis testing the suggestions in this Article.
That said, some costs of misconduct are relatively easy to identify.
There are costs associated with conducting internal investigations, costs
associated with entering negotiated settlement agreements, costs associated with third-party litigation, and ﬁnally there are potential reputational
costs associated when a ﬁrm allegedly engages in misconduct.287 When a
ﬁrm compares the many costs associated with a widespread and signiﬁcant
lapse in their compliance efforts, it may often be prudent to dedicate
resources in an ex ante effort to prevent the ex post costs associated with
non-compliance.
7. Are there Compliance Failures that this Article’s Proposal Fails to
Address? — A concern one may have with this Article’s argument and
proposals is that they appear to address only one aspect of compliance
failures, which may mean that a ﬁrm could employ the suggestions
presented and still ﬁnd itself in a situation where it is dealing with a
signiﬁcant compliance failure. That is a fair critique.
This Article is not meant to address the root cause of every
compliance failure within ﬁrms. Indeed, this Article is purposefully
focused on a very speciﬁc type of compliance failure—when a ﬁrm has
information about a compliance failure but fails to act on that information
in a prompt manner. There are, however, other related issues that can lead
to compliance failures. For example, this Article focuses on silos within
ﬁrms, but silos can occur at the regulatory and enforcement level as well.288
Additionally, this Article focuses on internal activities within ﬁrms, but
many incentives for ﬁrms to engage in robust compliance efforts come
from external sources.289 The reality is that because the ﬁeld of compliance
within legal scholarship is a burgeoning one, many important questions
remain unanswered at this time. This Article is just one of many aimed at

287. See, e.g., Press Release, Walmart, Walmart Reaches Agreements with the DOJ and the
SEC to Resolve Their FCPA Investigations (June 20, 2019), https://corporate.walmart.com/
newsroom/2019/06/20/walmart-reaches-agreements-with-the-doj-and-the-sec-to-resolve-theirfcpa-investigations [https://perma.cc/433Z-RWNA] (noting that Walmart entered into a
settlement with the government for $282.7 million and also “spent more than $900 million on
FCPA inquiries and investigations, its Global Compliance Program and organizational
enhancements”); Bernie Pazanowski, Walmart Avoids Suit over Alleged Mexican Bribery
Scheme, Bloomberg Law (Dec. 26, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/
walmart-avoids-suit-over-alleged-mexican-bribery-scheme (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); Kim Souza, Walmart Agrees to a $160 Million Settlement of a Class-Action Lawsuit, Talk
Business (Oct. 26, 2018), https://talkbusiness.net/2018/10/walmart-agrees-to-a-160-millionsettlement-of-a-class-action-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/H5GE-T6PN].
288. See Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, supra note 90, at 1028–31 (noting
challenges associated with intra- and interagency coordination).
289. Id. at 1010–17.
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addressing the multifaceted challenges associated with ﬁrms’ efforts to
create and implement effective ethics and compliance programs.290
CONCLUSION
Whether it is General Motors, Wells Fargo, the Catholic Church, or
Uber, complex organizations are in a constant battle to achieve better and
more robust compliance within their ranks. But the effort to ensure compliance with legal and regulatory mandates, industry standards and practices,
and their own internal policies and procedures is a difficult one in need of
scholarship that challenges common understandings of compliance within
firms.
This Article makes three distinct contributions to legal scholarship.
First, it explains that complex organizations encounter more difficulty in
creating compliance programs because they are responsible for
developing programs that will successfully span diffuse departments and
corporate entities. Second, it demonstrates that these complex
organizations are likely to suffer from information silos that make it more
difficult for firms to detect and investigate potential compliance failures.
Third, it applies findings from organizational behavior and corporate governance regarding the power of process reforms to the efforts of complex organizations to adopt global compliance programs. In doing so, it demonstrates
how focusing on process reforms will allow complex organizations to adopt
more integrated and complex compliance programs that are better equipped
to address corporate misconduct.
Complex organizations should find ways to incorporate process within
their compliance efforts. They must identify mechanisms for implementing
complex compliance reforms that will allow them to integrate structure,
composition, and process within their compliance programs. When this is
achieved, complex organizations will be better equipped to address
misconduct within their ranks.

290. The Author has several articles addressing various compliance issues. See, e.g.,
Root, The Compliance Process, supra note 33; Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives,
supra note 90; Veronica Root Martinez, More Meaningful Ethics, 1/8/2020 U. Chi. L. Rev.
Online 1; Martinez, The Outsized Inﬂuence, supra note 276. There is, of course, additional
scholarship in the compliance literature, much of which is cited above, but there are other
recent pieces of scholarship. See, e.g., John Armour, Brandon Garrett, Jeffrey Gordon &
Geeyoung Min, Board Compliance, 104 Minn. L. Rev. 1191 (2020); Stavros Gadinis &
Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance, 103 Minn. L. Rev. 2135 (2019).

